APPLEGATE PARTNERSHIP CASE STUDY:
GROUP DYNAMICS AND COMMUNITY CONTEXT

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The Applegate Partnership is an experiment in public participation which represents a human dimension of ecosystem-based management. This report focuses on the group dynamics and community context of the Partnership. We use qualitative, case study research methods in an attempt to provide a rich, detailed description of the Partnership's story. Their story takes place in a 500,000 acre watershed located in Southwest Oregon and Northern California, seventy percent of which is either Forest Service (USFS) or Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands. The natural and human community is complex and diverse, affecting the Partnership in a number of ways.

This executive summary offers a synopsis of the following report on the Applegate Partnership. Since partnerships are almost always complex, sensitive and elusive processes, and because we believe there are potentially useful and important ideas throughout the report, we strongly recommend its entire reading. We submit this summary only as a skeletal guide. Further, this summary should be read in conjunction with the "Lessons" section located toward the end of the document which suggests social learning that can be derived from the current study.

The Partnership's grass roots beginnings brought together the timber industry, conservation groups, natural resource agencies and residents cooperating to promote ecosystem health and diversity as well as economic and community stability. A large group meeting soon led to a Board of Directors who quickly developed a vision, goals and objectives. With inspiration, high energy, wisdom and skill, as well as a lot of help and good fortune, they focused on common interests--as opposed to previously polarized positions--to carry out their vision. While there were some early oversights--some of which continue to haunt them--they made their way through some remarkably difficult times. Part of their success must be explained by the extraordinary talent, skill and experience they assembled, the almost intimidating amount of work they put in, and the good fortune they had in finding the right group "chemistry."

The strong character, integrity and skills of the group members helped nurture the tenuous state of trust and aided them when conflicts arose. By spending a lot of time together--both work and nonwork-related--Partnership members were able to dissolve previously held stereotypes and engage in trust-building processes. Trust became so important that the group had to guard against suppressing conflicts that some feared might undermine trust. Conflict, as should be expected, is common, though over time its frequency, intensity and duration eased. Volunteer facilitators helped, as did some of the group members especially skilled in managing conflict.
The difficulties resulting from FACA, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, were substantial. When interest groups threatened lawsuits should the Act be violated, the Partnership’s momentum was severely disrupted upon losing agency representatives and their many resources. Though there is disagreement about just what FACA really meant to the Partnership, it clearly reinforced the old "us-them" sense between the agencies and their publics.

The issue of constituency groups is particularly complex. Accordingly, Board members’ tasks are complicated as they try to satisfy a wide range of constituent interests. The fact that so much of the Applegate Valley is on national lands makes for a plausible argument that all citizens have a stake, and therefore, a counted voice, in the land’s management. Though the vast majority of constituents do not understand the day-to-day work of the Partnership, they still raise a bevy of concerns, all legitimate from their point of view. Ironically, some constituent activity, including an environmental group’s withdrawal and a lawsuit filed against a proposed timber sale, only served to strengthen the Partnership alliance.

Some resistant or immoderate constituents argued against participation in the Partnership. This was particularly true whenever that group held more power. As the Partnership developed, environmentalists were particularly resistant because of logging restrictions owed to the spotted owl’s listing as a threatened species. When the Republicans captured the Congress in November of 1994, timber constituents began reasserting their primacy, both within and outside the Partnership. This power shift served as an implicit argument for the efficacy of Partnerships, since outside forces can not be predicted or counted on.

The community context of the Partnership is significant to the beginning and sustaining of the Partnership. The Applegate community, like many rural resource-dependent communities, is undergoing social and demographic transitions which challenge traditional ways of life; however, its social and economic diversity and its extensive ties to regional centers and other communities within--and even beyond--the region have allowed the community to adapt proactively to these changes. Peoples’ strong attachment to place contributes to their ability to unite to protect valued natural resources and "re-create" community despite conflicting interest affiliations. Various dimensions of the Applegate community, including its geography, relationships and social systems, provide a unique backdrop for the Partnership, most notable are the changes brought by waves of migrants with differing values, resources and expectations are significant. "Midtimers" and "newcomers" challenge the traditional community, but also contribute greatly to its ability to effect change, as demonstrated by their leading involvement in the Partnership.

Attributes of the Applegate community considered critical to the success of the Partnership include:
- social and economic diversity, environmental and social activism
- community capacity and local leadership networked throughout the community and region
- extensive indigenous knowledge about and commitment to resource management and planning
- contributions of leadership and resources from regional non-profit organizations.

The Partnership has made a number of effective community outreach efforts; it works continuously at gaining broad representation. A community assessment identified key informal leadership networks and issues within the community; the Watershed Council has completed a number of successful projects; and the Applegator has provided a neutral community forum for sharing information, local history and diverse ideas.

A range of potential measures of success have been suggested by other theorists and practitioners. Overall, two dimensions of success emerge, outcomes and processes. While the Partnership has demonstrated success on some outcome variables, its greatest strengths so far have been on the process dimensions such as improving relationships, managing conflict and building understandings. Barriers to outcome successes are in large part beyond the domain of the Partnership; they include market forces, institutional barriers and social inequality.

For those interested in other ongoing or future partnership, Adaptive Management Area or related processes we derive a number of lessons from the Applegate experience. We also end with some suggestions for agencies based on our observations and participation with the Partnership.
INTRODUCTION

The Promise

Policy makers, scientists and managers are recognizing that major shifts are required in the way we manage our natural resources. Ecosystem management is seen as the new approach to forest planning and, in order for it to be successful, related institutional processes will be radically altered. This new paradigm will require:

* a move from reductionist to holistic perspectives
* a move from reactive to proactive management
* a move from simplifying to embracing complexity and diversity
* a move from command and control to cooperation and understanding
* a move from predictability and certainty to unpredictability and uncertainty
* a move from short-term to long-term thinking
* a move from concern for structure to concern for dynamics and processes
* a move from social reform and regulation to social learning
* a move from top-down decision flow to bottom-up (Meffe, 1994; Stankey, 1994).

At the same time, some timber workers, ranchers, and local environmentalists are recognizing that the forestry conflicts in which they've engaged might ultimately compromise the sustainability of the resources and communities upon which they depend. They are creating coalitions through which they can accept the legitimacy of others' views, renew individual responsibility and recreate a sense of community among the people, land and resources. These partnership groups are distinctive in that:

* they are place based and resource linked
* they support management of ecosystems for biological and economic sustainability and social well-being
* they seek a diversity of perspectives
* they are inclusive
* they embrace open processes which are collaborative and consensus based
* they foster local participation in resource management and community development
* they focus on areas of agreement rather than disagreement

The Applegate Partnership is a bold experiment in public participation. It aims towards "constituency-based ecosystem management," as it highlights the connection between sustainable forests and community well-being. Its guiding principles are that resource management activities must be
"ecologically creditable, aesthetically acceptable and economically viable" (Applegate Partnership, 1993, p. 2). While we agree that "... there is a long way to go before ecosystem management is in practice" (p. VIII-FEMAT), we believe that the Applegate Partnership leads us in that direction and that we have much to learn from it.

Among the most critical elements of the Partnership activity are its group dynamics and community involvement. The extent to which we understand the group dynamics and community setting of groups like the Partnership is the extent to which we understand the social foundation on which ecosystem management rests.

This report documents the story of the Applegate Partnership (Neustadt & May, 1986; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 1994). After briefly describing our research methods and the Applegate setting, we recount some of the most significant group dynamics and process issues the Applegate Partnership has faced. We begin with how they started and then depict the group "chemistry" as well as the representatives themselves. This is followed by an "issues" section, in which we take up concerns like trust, conflict management, FACA, constituencies and power. We then turn to the community context, exploring a wide range of variables as we examine how the Partnership interacts with its community. We next address the question of "success" and finally conclude with sections on lessons for future learning and a note to the agencies. A glossary (Appendix A) defines acronyms and terms commonly used and understood by many readers (e.g., FACA and AMA).

We would like to mention here that this report is being completed the summer of 1995. Given that the Partnership is a highly innovative and fluid process, with significant changes and shifts a common occurrence (especially in group dynamics and related issues), it is likely that some Partnership characteristics will be modified within a short time. Nonetheless, we offer the document as a part of that process and expect that it should be of interest to those seeking to understand what those involved in the Partnership consider to be "history in the making."

Finally, parts of the report are written to stand on their own; some readers may find the lessons and notes to agencies adequate; others may choose the group dynamics or community section as addressing their interests.

**Qualitative Methods**

This report is based on qualitative research methods. As social science aims at generalization, reliability and replicability of results, descriptive case studies provide foundational work toward those ends. Though single cases are obviously restricted by sample size, there are also a large number of potential advantages offered by a qualitative research design.
First, this method seeks to offer a richer, more vivid and more abundantly detailed picture than a casual or a quantitatively-derived account would provide. That is, as contrasted with, for example, a lot of tables and listings of survey results, we instead want to provide the reader with a description with which s/he might more fully resonate and thus make subsequent use of. A related and second aim is to confirm but elaborate and fill in much of what has gone before (e.g., research literature offered by Wondolleck & Yaffee (1994), Shannon (1994) and others) and to highlight previously identified variables, events and concepts especially important for this particular case. For example, Wondolleck & Yaffee (1994) identified "willingness of groups to cooperate" (p. 51) as a factor contributing to public participation success; we try to show how that willingness was fostered on the Applegate. A third possibility offered in this descriptive methodology is the tentative disconfirmation of previous findings. A deeper, more detailed description may reveal limitations of previously held ideas and/or assumptions; some of our observations about the media's role likely fit this category. Our fourth and perhaps most obvious goal is to generate new ideas for further exploration. Some of these are suggested in the "Lessons" section. All of these goals are accomplished to the extent we can give voice to the players involved (unavailable in research methods that look more broadly but in less depth), while simultaneously cross-checking those perspectives with our own, participant-observation based experiences.

This study is supplemented as well by a larger environmental research agenda which spans seven years (e.g., Lange, 1990, 1993; Sturtevant, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993) and includes some work in environmental alternative dispute resolution (Lange, 1992, 1994). In the current case, we have steadily followed data gathering and field work recommendations offered by methodologists Lofland and Lofland (1995) and Spradley (1979, 1980). We have immersed ourselves in environmentalist, timber industry and natural resource agency cultures through regular and continual presence, extensive interviewing and examination of written materials. The larger process has involved over 950 hours of direct participant observation of strategy and planning meetings of a wide number of related groups (including other partnerships), conferences, government hearings, political demonstrations and other gatherings held by various organizations and groups. The current work also draws from 26 audiotaped "intensive" interviews with "informants" (Lofland & Lofland, 1995), averaging 90 minutes per interview; scores of informal interviews, shared car and plane rides, lunches and dinners; dozens of occasions when we "checked in" with "subjects" to ask for interpretation of events; in addition to the participant observation data gathered.

This last set of data was gathered while Lange acted as an outside party co-facilitator and Sturtevant regularly attended meetings. For almost two years, for every other meeting, Lange helped the Partnership organize its meeting agenda, keep on task, adhere to communication ground rules, and manage...
certain conflicts. He did **not** act as an official mediator or convener. He joined the Partnership as a facilitator, at members' request, after they were well under way. This relationship placed him more toward the participant end of the participant-observer continuum, though he was acting as an outside agent. Sturtevant served on the board of the Rogue Institute, assisted the community assessment efforts and attended various regional meetings regarding community-initiated efforts at sustainable development. To further clarify: neither are residents of the valley; Lange's regularized facilitation ended in early 1995; Sturtevant continues to attend Partnership meetings on a regular basis.

Finally, we have examined a wide range of case "artifacts" including: local newsletters, press releases and miscellaneous publications written by representatives from different groups (e.g., *The Applegator*, the Board's current journal; the *Evergreen*, SOTA's publication; and the *Headwaters Journal*); articles reported by the Associated Press, United Press International and local daily newspapers; and various analyses in the national and regional "environmental press."

The interested reader can see how reliability, validity and other traditional, quantitative methodological concerns are handled in a qualitative design in any number of methods texts (e.g., Lofland & Lofland, 1995; Spradley, 1979; 1980). Here, let us simply say that we have carefully followed the equally rigorous, yet substantially different rules of this type of research method. Through participation, observation, Board member verification--and general long-time immersion into the Applegate Partnership process--we believe we can confidently report insiders' views.

**Setting**

The Applegate River watershed encompasses just under 500,000 acres in Southwest Oregon (and a bit of Northern California). Among its many ownerships are residential lots, small woodland and hobby farms, industrial forests, and federal lands—a patchwork of legal entities defining diverse individual, group and organizational interests in an acknowledged and valued geographical area. Those living or otherwise involved here often know it in different ways, but many have joined collectively in the Partnership to defend its ecological integrity. The Applegate Adaptive Management Area's 275,000 acres comprise about 60% of the Applegate watershed. Another 10% is on federal lands allocated as Late Successional Reserves and wilderness (Spinos and Rolle, 1995; FEMAT, 1993).¹

Located in the Klamath Geological Province formed 250 million years ago, the watershed has great genetic diversity because the geological formation provided a "bridge" for plant migration between the Cascades and Coastal ranges. This bridge is still functioning today for scores of rare plants (e.g.,

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¹See Glossary for definitions of Adaptive Management Area and Late Successional Reserves.
Baker's cypress and American saw-wort), sensitive vertebrates (Townsend's western big-eared bat, bald eagles and peregrine falcon) and unusual parent rock types (serpentine). The Applegate has the largest number of known spotted owl nests of the ten AMA's (Doak, 1995). The watershed is steep and rugged, ranging from 1,000 to 7,000 feet elevation with a rainfall range between 20 and 100 inches per year (Applegate Partnership, 1992; Spinos and Rolle, 1995). Its lowlands and river beds provide valleys for farming, ranching and residences; its forested highlands provide timber and other forest products, recreation, and grazing.

Intensive logging, extensive road building, hydraulic mining, fire suppression and a decade of drought have dramatically changed the composition and structure of the forest. Currently, much of the forest consists of overcrowded young and old stands with high levels of insect damage, altered species diversity and increased risk of catastrophic fire. This risk is compounded by an increase in the number of rural residential dwellings, surrounded by dense, continuous vegetation, in the forest interface.

Many of Southern Oregon's most active watershed-based environmental groups are located in this area. The central organization, Headwaters, was formed in the mid-70's by "back to the landers" who were concerned about large-scale clear-cutting, herbicide applications and upstream riparian damage which threatened the perceived quality of life in their neighborhoods. By the mid-1980's, in this valley and throughout the region, local, regional and national environmentalists' legal protests and appeals of federal land management decisions halted timber sales. In 1990, federal court injunctions pertaining to the spotted owl halted most land management activity.

The human community is complex. Spreading throughout the valley and surrounding hillsides, residents are connected to a number of non-incorporated places and two nearby service/employment centers in two different counties (Medford and Grants Pass in Jackson and Josephine counties, respectively). The population includes timber workers and ranchers, small woodlot owners, and waves of urban escapees, starting with "back-to-the-landers" in the 1960's and more recently California "equity" migrants. Many current residents are self-employed, connected to markets and business centers through mail order catalogs and fax machines. The main highways are filled during the weekdays with commuters travelling to and from work in the nearby cities, on Wednesday nights and Sunday mornings with Applegate Christian Fellowship worshippers and on weekends with recreationalists. Although the shift

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2Other watershed and environmental groups in the Valley, many of which are networked through Headwaters, include North Applegate Watershed Protection Association, Williams Watershed Protection Association, Threatened and Endangered Little Applegate Valley Association, Carberry Creek Association, Thompson Creek Residents for Ecological Education, Forest Creek Association, Murphy Creek Citizens Group, and Applegate Watershed Conservancy.
Southwest Oregon, the loss of community and the erosion of a way of life are keenly felt in this Valley. All of these issues are discussed further in the "Community" portion of this report.
GROUP DYNAMICS

Virtually every practitioner and theorist who studies partnerships would agree that group dynamics are a critical component. At this juncture we therefore preview the Partnership dynamics by presenting information on the Partnership "start-up" and on some of the Board members, especially its more central figures. From there, we move to what we believe are the Partnership's central group dynamics issues: trust, conflict management, FACA, dealing with constituents and power.

Start-up

As we see it now, in the early days, the Applegate Partnership did a lot of things right, though in some sense, it was "beginner's luck." It is evident they had leaders of vision and high energy, made good decisions about how to broaden the base of participation and avoid obvious conflicts of interest, and performed other difficult but necessary organizational work with relative ease. But their skill, zeal, wisdom and good fortune may have misled them into neglecting some concerns to which they should have attended, concerns that continue to haunt the Partnership two and a half years later.

A favorite Partnership story is in fact about their romantic and grass roots beginning. It is a quixotic and almost sentimental tale, as two "unlikely collaborators" (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 1994) led the way: Jack Shipley, a local environmentalist, and Jim Neal, logger and board member of Aerial Forest Management Foundation, a non-profit group supporting use of aerial systems for harvesting timber. After a number of discussions during which they identified their mutual interests, Shipley and Neal began networking with a small group of trusted associates from industry, environmental groups and the agencies (including then Ashland District Ranger, Mary Smelcer). They circulated a brief white paper, drafted by Tom Atzet and Mike Amaranthus of the Forest Service, outlining basic tenets and then held a meeting for interested parties on Shipley's deck in late October of 1992. Shipley asked participants (estimates range from 40 to 70) to introduce themselves not by affiliation but by hopes and dreams for the Applegate, and it quickly became clear that this was an exciting and rare opportunity for a local, cooperative approach to forest management and forest politics.

That first day, the group started establishing criteria for a working Board, for example, that participants be wise, skilled and without an agenda. It was important that they care deeply about the place itself (see Kemmis, 1990) and that they have a personal stake. It was only a week later, at a less well

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The idea of "personal stake" seems critical. Without such a stake, partnership members are less likely to stay committed to the process. Each member is there for a reason, whether that be personal or professional, financial or simply noble.
attended second meeting, that the group identified nine Board members and nine alternates, people who would represent different sides of the conflict, i.e., environmental, timber, agency and community. Of course over time there were resignations, replacements and additions, but the core Partnership members emerged at that second gathering. [Please refer to Appendix I for a listing of members. Also please see the section on nongovernmental organizations.]

At their first official meeting, the members developed a "vision statement":

The Applegate Partnership is a community-based project involving industry, conservation groups, natural resource agencies, and residents cooperating to encourage and facilitate the use of natural resource principles that promote ecosystem health and diversity. Through community involvement and education, this partnership supports management of all land within the watershed in a manner that sustains natural resources and that will, in turn, contribute to economic and community stability within the Applegate Valley (Applegate Partnership, 1992).

Starting only with the white paper, Board members were able to write this defining manifesto in only one and one half hours. The vision statement then helped focus the group on commonly shared goals and objectives, which they worked on together (and individually) for the next two or three months. At BLM representative John Lloyd’s urging, they were particularly careful to include basic objectives, not ground-specific prohibitions or projects (cf. Applegate Partnership, 1993). They worked hard to identify common interests, as opposed to the old, opposing positions (Fisher & Ury, 1984). (For example, instead of writing "no new road building"—which the agencies by law could not "sign off" on and the timber contingent would not support—they wrote "minimize erosion," which identified at least one of the interests behind the position.) Subsequently, the vision and goals served as a map and guide. As their work progressed, when the group occasionally encountered a dilemma as to how to proceed, they turned to the vision and goals. In this way, if they went astray, they had a path to which they could return.

There were other wise moves, especially early on, with corresponding hard work and good fortune as operations progressed. Feeling that media and politicians often exacerbated conflicts, the Partnership stayed "underground" the first five months—until February of 1993—in order to keep these two groups away from the delicately emerging process. Eventually, after they "came out," they created their emblem, the "No They" button, as it is called, in which the word "THEY" is symbolically negated with a red line slashing through it. Many people, within the natural resource community and without, were enamored with such a hopeful and elegantly presented sentiment. Many thousands of these buttons were distributed,

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They were also careful not to transgress any laws or federal agency policies.
sometimes for a dollar donation each (at different forestry and community events). More substantively, they developed a design team that identified weighted criteria for ecosystem management (old growth, biodiversity, community concerns, etc.) and were able to judge that the first proposed timber sale (the previously approved "Ramsey Thin") met the criteria. The agencies provided help and guidance throughout these early meetings. Groundwork for innovation had been laid by visionary leaders like Jim Gladen, Rogue River Forest Supervisor and Ron McCormack, retired Siskiyou Forest Supervisor. Getting help from Forest ecologists Tom Atzet and Mike Amaranthus proved important to the Partnership. Encouragement from Dave Jones, Rich Drehobel and others in the BLM was also invaluable. The agencies were "stretching" to accommodate this new phenomena.

Early in the process the group decided to conduct ecosystem and community assessments to further guide their approach. The Ecosystem Assessment used scientists and community members from within (or close to) the Partnership circle. The Community Assessment was conducted by a team led by a local anthropologist under contract with the Rogue Institute for Ecology and Economy, an important Partnership constituent group.\(^5\) The data from both assessments were viewed as fair and neutrally derived; all Board members had confidence in the processes and outcomes. These were important moves since they prevented the "you get your science and I'll get mine" phenomenon when hammering out difficult decisions.\(^6\)

In January of 1993, a facilitator began helping the Partnership with meetings. When he left in the Spring, two new facilitators (including one of the authors) stepped in. Both independently agreed to help; neither asked for a fee. Over time, the facilitators helped the Partnership with communication, goal-setting, meeting structure, group dynamics and conflict management. That summer, during an all day "retreat" held at Southern Oregon State College, the facilitators assisted Board member agreement on productive "ground rules" of communication (e.g., it's OK to express feelings, how to do so productively, etc.). They facilitated a goal-setting and prioritizing session, during which Board members collectively identified their top priority goals for the next specified length of time. Ideas to improve meeting structure and organization were generated as well.

The facilitators were also active during almost all later Board meetings for the next two years. Taking turns attending and facilitating these meetings, they kept track of time and helped the group construct and get through its agenda. Trained mediators, they also helped the group move through thorny issues and

\(^5\)Supported through the USFS and BLM and grants from various foundations and granting institutions.

\(^6\)An economic assessment was begun in 1995, with the aid of Southern Oregon State College personnel.
difficult moments. They would point out when ground rules were "broken." When tempers flared--fairly often at first--they helped restore order. Generally, the facilitators attempted to allow the group to work out its own conflicts, but in productive ways.

In early 1995, after two years of work, both facilitators ceased their regular attendance and participation in meetings. They each believed that by then, Board members could perform most facilitative functions on their own, which they have done. Since then, the two facilitators have helped with a couple of particularly difficult meetings. They also "stand by" for similar future requests.

Thus, as one looks back in time at the organizing "deck party," at the member selection and vision process, at the local facilitation and the rest, the way the Partnership began epitomizes the very phrase "grass roots." This style was, and is, clearly one of their great strengths. From the start, it has been a "bottom up" process, carried forward by people with a personal stake in the outcome. Another favorite Partnership story involves the visit from Regional Forest Supervisor John Lowe. At one point Lowe innocently asked, "Well, who gave you the authority to do all this?" After looking around at each other, a number of people chimed in that no-one had given them any authority; they were just doing it!

Still, we wonder if this informal and organic style may have combined with the surprisingly easy problem-solving and good fortune they first encountered to contribute to some later difficulties. The easily reached consensus on the early issues might have led to a false sense of their abilities. And while it is clear that the professional work provided by the facilitators and agency partners was helpful, having such expertise from the very beginning might have been even more useful. We discuss this possibility further in the "Lessons" section.

Here we will say that the Partnership was a grass roots effort of caring people who, through a combination of skill, wisdom, luck, a lot of help and extraordinary hard work, started a group that caught the attention of the natural resource community. They developed amongst themselves a special feeling that was often reflected in the language of Board members. Early on one member said that, "We're onto something that will change the world here." Linguistic phrases that continually came up were about being "on the team," "in the circle," "at the table." This language indicated an unusual amount of group cohesiveness, considering that members were so recently adversaries. Of course, it wasn't all roses for the Partnership. And their success, however large or small, is at least to some extent a result of the particular persons and "chemistry" of their particular circle.

"Chemistry" and personality

Those of us who study ongoing intact groups of any kind--let alone a partnership of previously disputing members--are always seeking generalizable knowledge of what makes groups work well or
poorly. But we still begrudgingly acknowledge the importance of a host of situational variables, not the least of which is a set of hard-to-identify factors like "chemistry," or "personalities." While it does not preclude other generalizable lessons, we believe that the Partnership's particular chemistry, along with the corresponding specific set of individual personality characteristics, contribute as much as anything else to its performance.

Clearly, one part of the group's "chemistry" was the shared belief that they were on to something special. Early in the process different board members spoke about how this process was reflective of a "new paradigm" that would help "change the world." One agency member told us that this process would go on "perhaps forever," as there was so much potential for productive, collaborative work. As time went on, members regularly contrasted their way of working together to the old ways of fighting. They continuously congratulated themselves on how they were so much better off than other partnership groups around the country who were struggling. They held a near-unshakable faith in themselves and what they were doing.

The good "chemical composition" was also evident in how well group members managed to fill all the important functions of group process (e.g., Bales, 1970; Benne & Sheats, 1948). That is, there were those who initiated ideas, as well as those who regularly "tested" them as a "devil's advocate." Some members were particularly creative or innovative; others were detail-oriented and organized. And while there were members who shied away from conflict, others knew how to embrace it or appropriately smooth it over. Some were newcomers with a lot of enthusiasm and fresh energy; others were experienced with lots of insight based on history of involvement. Though a few Board members and alternates (now called "Co-Board members") have left since the Partnership's inception, and while some new ones have since arrived, the following descriptions of a just a few core members will provide an idea of some of the skills and personality characteristics to which we refer. (As stated, a full listing of Partnership Board members and Co-Board members appears in Appendix II.)

**The representatives**

Partnership leadership functions are often shared, yet there is general agreement that Jack Shipley leads on more dimensions than anyone else. He is a relentless and committed worker who has made the Partnership a—if not the—major focus of his life. He has sufficient means so that he does not have to work full time; instead he directs his enormous energies into Partnership business. He is so central that it is difficult to even imagine the Partnership without him. People count on him to do a prodigious amount of work. Jack is a visionary; he travels widely—often in his own small plane—to share the collaborative message of the Partnership. He regularly and passionately generates and offers new ideas and angles on
things. He is notably inclusive, actively welcoming and encouraging new people, divergent ideas and creative solutions. He will argue an environmental position one moment, an industry one the next. He calls himself a "zealot," is seen by some as a "loose cannon," and has managed to alienate himself from some members of the environmental community he originally represented. He has alternately defended and roared at the federal agencies. He is complex, to say the least.

Dwain Cross is another leader, a progressive representative from the timber industry who commands high credibility within that community. His innovative aerial logging projects in aesthetically and ecologically sensitive areas have earned him respect in the region. He provides a different kind of energy as he rails at Board members to take action. Like so many others from the industry, he is angry. He doesn't mind expressing that anger at Partnership meetings. Most members tolerate his venting (for which he usually apologizes afterward) and some seem to share his disdain for the agencies "lack of action." He continually casts the agencies or the Clinton administration or the Oregon Natural Resource Council (ONRC) or the bureaucrats or someone as the reason that "nothing is getting done" [i.e., timber sales]. Given that he is a co-owner of a local sawmill, that his primary interest is in timber sales, and that only Ramsey Thin has been implemented to date, his frustration and threats to leave are understandable. Other Board members value his participation and despite his often-aggressive style, want very much for him to stay. So far, they have always managed to persuade him to do so.

There are other leaders. To the extent FACA\textsuperscript{7} allows, Su Rolle "represents" the agencies. (That is, she is the interagency primary liaison, linking the Partnership with both the BLM and USFS.) A former Applegate District Ranger, she provides high energy, reality checking, big picture thinking. She is clearly one of the most creative and best problem-solvers. She has extraordinary group process and conflict management skills. When the group seems to veer off a positive track, she more than anyone helps steer it back. She is personally and professionally devoted to the Partnership, caring as much as humanly possible. When something goes poorly, she often takes it to heart.

Brett KenCairn, of the Rogue Institute for Ecology and Economy is one of the most creative idea people and the groups' wordsmith/letter writer. A smooth and extremely knowledgeable ambassador to other groups, he also possesses strong conflict management and group process skills and along with Su, is called upon to use them regularly. Sharla Moffett, of the Southern Oregon Timber Industries Association (SOTIA), is another representative from the industry; she provides a cleareyed, politically astute view from that constituency. She is a strong advocate, but a reasonable negotiator, expert at useful compromise.

\textsuperscript{7}The Federal Advisory Committee Act is defined in the Glossary; additional information on the effects of FACA appear in the "Issues" section below.
and consensus building. Chris Bratt is quiet and steady, the Board member with the longest history as an environmental activist. He is the environmental conscience who prevents the group's excitement from overcoming its good judgment. Most environmental issues pivot around Chris, making him a key figure on the vast majority of substantive discussions.

There are other important figures. Connie Young is a solid community member, a self-described "farm-wife," who models honest, heartfelt expression for the group. Enigmatic JD Rogers is another key community link, the longhaired conservative who constantly helps create an air of group affability. JD "holds down" the newsletter ("The Applegator," which will be discussed later). Chant Thomas is the counterculture environmentalist who eventually left the group, feeling unfairly "scapegoated" for his immoderate communication style. He correctly points out that at the meetings he was no more immoderate than Dwain. John Lloyd from the BLM was an original Board member. When he retired and moved from the area, it was a substantive and heartfelt loss to remaining Partnership members.  

And there are still more: Jim Neal, a catalyst at the very beginning and continuing behind the scenes; Mary Smelcer, the new Applegate District ranger (though around the Partnership since inception), an experienced problem-solver who knows how to speak directly yet with sensitivity; Dennis Martinez, a Native American whose incredible oral skills and knowledge of Indian history regularly engaged the group; Keri Green, whose good humored but disciplined facilitation kept the group centered; unsung community constituents like Hal Macy, who comes to every meeting and helps with project after project, and Maggie Purves, who reliably serves as the group's treasurer; detail-oriented, extremely competent and dedicated Jan Prettu, who along with the patient and proficient Daryl Jackson, spearheads the related Watershed Council work; Janet Jones and Phyllis Hughes, who've taken incredibly accurate and sensitive minutes; and many, many more who similarly contribute extraordinary amounts of time to move the Partnership forward. The time expenditure would in fact, be difficult to overestimate; many thousand personhours have gone into this effort. This expenditure includes substantial "behind the scenes" work by agency scientists who have contributed to the ecological assessment, provided necessary information and have come to dozens of meetings for one reason or another.

We present all this in order to paint a picture of the individuals who make the Partnership work. Somehow, these very different people found ways to accommodate differences and tolerate idiosyncrasies,

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8Though he would have had to leave in any case, FACA hurried his exit from the Board.

9The above focuses on what we take to be unique and positive contributions made by individual members and related personnel. Please see Appendix I for a complete listing of Board members.
overcome adversity and manage internal conflicts, share tasks and inspire each other to do whatever was needed to be done. They learned to take advantage of the wide array of talents and skills that each individual brought to the group. We believe that if the "chemistry" and "personalities" of these people were different, there may have been far less success.

Of course the process has had its share of difficulties as well. We turn now to a set of key issues that emerged in our study of group dynamics: trust, conflict management, FACA, effects of constituents, power and media.
ISSUES FOR THE GROUP

Trust

Trust is one of the most important yet elusive concepts within all group dynamics and human interaction. Twenty-five hundred years ago, Aristotle was moved to write that ethos—roughly akin to credibility and clearly related to trust—was the most potent factor in communication. He spoke of the importance of character, as in authenticity, and good will, as in treating others as one would wish to be treated. These concepts are still relevant in the contemporary study of trust. More to the point, they are characteristics of Applegate Partnership Board members. Yet beyond these personal attributes, while virtually every chronicler or theorist of environmental partnerships deals with the issue of trust, there are only a few additional generalizable principles anyone can add. This is partly because the behavioral correlates of trust vary widely; that is, trust is like a feeling, a state of being, sometimes shared and sometimes unwittingly held alone. It is also because trust can so easily come and go.

Social scientists know that once betrayed, trust is difficult to regain; one false move can destroy a relationship’s trust. We know that trust is especially difficult to build between those who were enemies in the past, as in for example, industry and environmental representatives. Social scientists also know, primarily through the study of negotiation (e.g., Lewicki & Literer, 1994), game theory (e.g. Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) and their extensions (e.g., Axelrod, 1984), that trust is built through an ongoing, sometimes predictable process.

The process begins when one party shows some sort of vulnerability or makes some sort of concession, e.g., an agreement to compromise in a conflict. For trust to develop, the other party must then not take advantage but respond in kind, e.g., not press for additional concessions, but reciprocate by offering his or her own. When persons in intact groups together enact this negotiating “dance,” and together implement shared agreements, trust can build over time. Of course there are specific areas that group members might or might not trust. One might trust that group members won’t undermine him/her, but might not trust them to always proactively aid his/her cause. We believe that this is the kind of trust held between Partnership board members. It may not be complete trust, but it is substantial nonetheless. In a videotaped interview, Dwain said, "Total trust yet in the Applegate Partnership has not been achieved. But it's certainly a lot further down the road than when we started."

Perhaps the simplest yet most far-reaching factor that explains the Partnership’s internal trust is

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10 A review of the now-burgeoning literature on trust can be found in Lewicki and Bunker (1995).
the fact that they spent so much time with each other. Brett offered this:

Trust was the objective from the beginning. But you can't magically create it. The only way you can build it is by sitting together, [long pause] a lot, and by going through all kinds of issues, and by seeing each other in our worst moods, behaviors, and almost giving up, and not, and witnessing another person's real deep pain and fear, and not turning away.

Previously held stereotypes and misconceptions dissolved as they worked toward their common goal. Jack reported that, "We're finding that those people who were perceived as enemies for so long are just like us." The Partnership built their own "social space" (Friedman, 1994) that allowed for discovery of commonalities and relationship building. Over time, Board members cultivated predictive knowledge of how other members would act. They knew they would work together for the immediate future and as time progressed, many of their internal relationships expanded beyond the meetings (see Van Maanen, 1992). They shared the love of a place (Kemmis, 1990)--the Applegate--where together they held community potlucks, drank beer, flew observation planes and walked miles of forest trails. They appeared together on panels, radio shows and in geographically distant forums. After a year or so they could fairly well predict what subjects to avoid at the table, who would say what when and the different effects a particular announcement would have. They learned how to "lobby" each other outside the meeting room, began to share their woes about constituency groups and increasingly saw themselves as a unit. On occasion they would "speak each other's lines," as when an environmentalist would advocate for timber or vice-versa; distinctions sometimes blurred. The enmity they once held for each other was steadily being replaced by trust.

Even early on, "trust" became a key word within their subculture. It permeated their press releases, their "official" videotape, their internal discussions. When arguments began, they reminded each other of a person's trustworthiness; this occurred sufficiently often that they even had to discuss the possibility that the watchword "trust" was overused, serving to stifle dissent. Still, as different members on occasion would travel around the country as guests of other would-be partnerships, their presentations focused on the trust that had developed. Dwain reported to the group one night that while he still could not "tolerate" some of their constituency members, he trusted "each and every one of you to never do anything that would deliberately hurt me." This came from a man who once wanted to "wring every goddamn environmentalist's neck."

A motto printed on their brochure, printed in 1993, says "Practice trust, them is us." That the motto reminds people to practice might represent an unspoken truth: that Partnership member's trust will
always be tenuous at best. Members' underlying interests are sufficiently different that trust is continuously tested, especially as other, related forest conflicts are waged.

Trust is tenuous in partnerships because of the near bizarre set of inconsistencies surrounding the process. While collaborative efforts inherently involve previously conflicting parties, these new "partners" at the table represent groups whose intense conflict continues right through the collaboration. For example, while representatives from the timber industry, environmental groups and resource agencies were attempting to collaborate on management of the Applegate watershed, others from both the industry and environmental camps were simultaneously filing lawsuits against the agencies for illegal forest management practice in the Northwest. (Though for different reasons and from different perspectives, the suits alleged illegality in Clinton's Forest Plan.) In addition, nationally and regionally, both environmental and timber activists continued intense negative information campaigns against the other (Lange, 1993). They lobbied the public, Congress and both agencies in an essentially competitive strategy. There are dozens of similar examples, all taking place while timber, environmental and agency "representatives" were attempting to find collaborative solutions to the localized, Applegate forest management problems.

These inconsistencies periodically resulted in minor conflicts among members, testing their trust. For example, during one meeting, a board member announced the news that a new lawsuit had been filed that day. Another member followed with a comment indicating disapproval of the plaintiff who filed. Someone else then defended the plaintiff and attacked the other person's constituency. This "zinger" was followed by verbal "return fire" by a still different party. And on it went until the facilitator pointed out what was happening. Though only temporary and otherwise negligible distractions, squabbles like these regularly reminded Board members that there were limits to being partners. Over time, members learned how to productively manage such episodes, as well as most other conflicts that surfaced.

Conflict management

Because surface they did. Conflict was and in fact still is a common occurrence. Though the intensity and frequency has diminished somewhat, the first year and a half was often contentious. A large number of group members carried resentment, anger and general enmity built over many years. Their twenty year history was continual confrontation and near bloody struggle. There were times when we could almost see the memories return to people's faces when seemingly minor disagreements started to expand and escalate. During some meetings there was an air of tension, a sensitivity even to "little jokes" and a tendency to make derogatory comments (later labeled "zingers") about other persons' constituent groups. Specific disagreements flared over a variety of issues: when in 1993 the Sierra Club faxed a "Red Alert" across the country, alleging illegal and poor environmental behavior by the Partnership; when some
members accused another of "unauthorized" speaking for the Partnership; when an industry constituent proposed that the Partnership ask the agencies to expand the AMA to encompass the entire Applegate watershed, including some forest reserves; when an environmental constituent "lectured" the Partnership about some of the Partnership's problems (in relationship to a grant application); when Headwaters, the major represented environmental group, cited internal organizational difficulties and suddenly dropped out of the Partnership; when FACA required the agencies to officially resign as board members; on numerous occasions when representatives felt the agencies were unresponsive; on numerous occasions when people argued about different aspects of what is "true" forest health; and on still more occasions. During one especially heated debate, one member jumped the table, grabbed another by the collar, and attempted to "take it outside." That this "collaborative" group would come so close to violence "shook" a number of its members.

The Partnership dealt with these conflicts with a fairly wide variety of responses and conflict management tools. On occasion they would turn to their ground rules, reminding themselves to express emotions productively. At other times, either members or facilitators would play a "harmonizing" group role, stepping in to "reframe" the disagreement into a learning opportunity. Though Board members did not go through conflict resolution training together, several are highly skilled conflict managers, Brett and Su in particular. These people often helped the group get through difficult moments and (perhaps unintentionally) modeled appropriate conflict behavior. On other occasions, members or facilitators would remind disputants that they were arguing with a partner, appealing to the special relationship that people held and their pride in this successful Partnership. Sometimes, disagreements were worked out in the hall during a break or at a light dinner prior to an evening meeting.

Also, as will be discussed below, the surrounding "superordinate enemies" (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961)—outside persons or groups perceived as obstructionists—served to solidify the group's relationships. And clearly the fact that they cared for each other carried them through some difficult times. As Wondolleck and Yaffee (1994) learned, "Many of those involved felt that the relationship-building was the most significant aspect of the entire process" (p. 1-4).

Yet with all that, one Board member offered this insightful summary on the group's current conflict management situation:

Even now we're still dealing with that big time. We still have issues around how to express ourselves honestly and openly but yet still with respect where we don't blow each other out of the water. It's still such a, you know, primal issue. . . We don't do it well. A great example was last week . . . [A board member] was extremely defensive around this and started arguing back instead
of seeing what was real. . . So there are lots and lots of real deep kinds of baggage stuff that still are going around big time; there's still stuff in terms of questioning each other's agendas. [A different board member] shot out the other night about, 'I'm sorry but I see you as an obstructionist,' to [a still different Board member], 'I see this as another obstructionist tactic.' And that 'You're just trying to slow things down.'...

[Interviewer response: 'This late [in the Partnership's development]?']

Yeah, this late, this late. So it tells me that we have lots of personal stuff around resolution of conflict still to be done if we're going to be a healthy and functional group.

FACA

One of the most difficult times that the Partnership has had to endure was during the Summer of 1994 when all of the agency partners had to officially withdraw, fearing lawsuits based on violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. It was not an unreasonable fear; such action was threatened in writing in the lawsuit filed against the "Partnership One" timber sale (the first "Partnership approved" sale other than the Ramsey Thin sale.) Intended to ensure fairness and prevent insider influence, FACA regulates interaction between public-sector employees and the constituents they represent.11 Even though agency representatives could continue to attend portions of the Partnership meetings, and even though they were allowed to exchange information, FACA was a severe blow to the Partnership. Su Rolle labeled it a crisis, that created fear, anger and frustration: "FACA of course, can not be overestimated in terms of the power it has had." Jack Shipley told a gathering:

"It's kind of scary to think about this. The law is good, but the problem is that its being enforced now when we have more interactive communication with agencies than in the last 20 years. The door was open to communication and has been temporarily slammed shut because of FACA (Rural People Speak Out, 1994).

FACA created a wedge between the agencies and the Partnership. Preventing agency representatives, particularly some of the USFS line staff, from participating in discussions that could be perceived as joint decision-making, FACA temporarily broke the spirit of the group. It brought back a feeling of exclusion, an "us-them" climate with the agencies remanded to their villainous role of "faceless bureaucrat." Interested community members now had to go to agency offices to see those who were no longer at the table. FACA reminded the group who really made the final decisions. As pointed out by Medinger (1995):

11 See Glossary for additional information on FACA.
If it [the agency] attends meetings of a self-organized ecosystem management group but leaves whenever discussion turns to matters that might involve federal policy, the agency risks exacerbating its image as arrogant and unresponsive and also undermines the capacity of the group to function at all where federal cooperation is important to the success of the overall effort (p 25). Further, without agency guidance, help and connection, the Partnership began to flounder. The situation was exacerbated during the summer when the Partnership temporarily lost their meeting room and when a heavy fire season further prevented agency participation.

There is some disagreement about the effects and implications of FACA. One (ex) agency board member believes that agency people started using FACA as an excuse not to come any more. Others felt that they, the agencies, were simply doing their best to respond to a difficult situation. However one judges the quality of the agency response, the agencies and remaining Board members are currently working around the restrictions. Another agency (ex) board member sums it up this way:

But in terms of the sense of trust and the sense that we’re really on board, I can say I’m a partner, we can say the feds are partners, and that we’re just not technically on the board anymore, but I think from most people’s hearts, you know, we’re out of it now.

Su Rolle hopes that something can eventually be done to overcome the losses that resulted from FACA.

We should point out that the one saving grace about FACA is that out of necessity, more community members stepped up and got involved in an attempt to partially compensate for agency loss. FACA perhaps might not be such a problem were it not for some of the Partnership’s organizational constituents; that is, the less moderate players in the forestry conflict who promise to sue the agencies if they do not adhere to FACA.

**Constituencies**

A number of writers (e.g., Carpenter & Kennedy, 1988; Gray, 1989) warn not to underestimate the importance or potential difficulties constituencies bring to these processes. After all, at least in some matters—"signing off" on a proposed timber sale for example—constituents have final decision-making authority (Ancona, Friedman & Kolb, 1991; Colosi, 1983). FACA was only one of the many problems generated by Board member "larger" constituencies; there were others and they appeared regularly. As observers, we were consistently reminded of the extraordinary complexity of representative-constituency relationships and the effects of that complexity. Each of the Board members represented not a single constituency, but a dense web of related groups, organizations and stakeholders. Matters were further complicated because many of these constituents have competing or at least different interests. Partnership Board members were often required to respond.
Chris is a twenty year valley resident, a carpenter in his sixties, from the outset a foundational, steady and major force on the Partnership Board. Clearly the key environmentalist, he belongs to a variety of environmental groups, though his place with the Partnership originally evolved from his representation of Headwaters, the major environmental presence in Southern Oregon. Headwaters is closely linked to other local, regional and national groups with an interest in the Partnership; including the "nationals"—the Sierra Club, the Wilderness Society, Audubon, the National Wildlife Federation, the Sierra Legal Defense Fund and others. Some might argue that because the Applegate watershed holds 350,000 acres of national land, Chris represents millions of stakeholders who may (or even may not) be "national" environmental group members. Some environmentalists and scholars (e.g., Nash, 1989; Stone, 1974) have even argued that environmentalists' constituencies include wildlife, trees and other flora and fauna.

Putting those arguments aside temporarily (as they may beg the question of what is a constituency), it is enough to say here that there are multiple connections between many constituency groups and stakeholders, severely complicating representation. Chris had to answer not only to Headwaters and to community members in the Applegate, but to interested intermediaries from all the other local, regional and national groups. They frequently disagreed among themselves and often gave conflicting advice to Chris on Applegate policy negotiations. Chris lamented that

It seems like it's a new thing every day. I have to continually deal with new challenges [to the Partnership]. Make new responses. There's so much paper and so much hand-holding. 'Oh, OK. How are you feeling now guys? Is everybody else OK?'

Sharla's full-time job is to represent to the public the largest, local timber alliance (SOTIA, the Southern Oregon Timber Industries Association). SOTIA is also connected to other local, regional and national groups, from the tiny but vocal "Save Our Sawmills" to the imposing and robust American Forest and Paper Association. Another energetic leader, and Chris's timber counterpart, Sharla said:

Well, [my constituency groups] get frustrated at the lack of results. They wonder if this is a good investment of time. People outside the area give me a lot of flak. But if they're not there, they can't fathom the process, the patience, the grind of it all. They can't understand the work... None of this is easy.

Agency and community representatives face some of the same concerns, as they are connected to layers of larger groups who, by and large, do not understand the nature or amount of the Partnership's work.

Members' relationship to distant "uninformed" groups raise a second item. This is the inherent contradiction and resulting difficulties when localized, place-specific groups attempt to address issues of
national concern. The Partnership realizes that the national forests "belong" to all American citizens, but the vast majority of such stakeholders and even more specific constituents could not possibly be kept abreast of every "on the ground" problem that locals might confront. Perhaps even more importantly, they do not participate in the week to week work; they do not develop the trust and relationships that the partners do. And so while Board members were developing trust, constituents were sometimes worrying that they were getting too cozy amongst themselves. They levied even more pressure on the Board.

Alliances began to shift. As the Partnership began succeeding as a team, despite various problems, their relationships with their constituents were continually challenged. In addition to Chris and Sharla—who seemed most connected to the largest number of constituents—other members were experiencing difficulty conveying the group's work to those they represented, especially those outside the local community. Eventually, some constituents were cast as "superordinate enemies" (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). That is, these constituents were viewed less as supporters or allies and more as outsiders. Board members started likening themselves to the Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers, encountering more difficulty and resistance from their regional and national counterparts than from each other. FACA contributed to the agencies being similarly cast.

Such shifting alliances represent the third constituent-related issue for the Partnership to consider. Though many constituents were supportive, all the represented groups had vocal detractors, further contributing to Board member difficulty and resentment. Timber industry personnel often ridiculed their Board representatives for the lack of timber sale output. Dwain admitted, "My industry friends ask me, 'Why would you want to sit down and try to reason with those assholes?'" Early in the process, some agency personnel scorned their colleagues for spending so much time with non-agency personnel. One longtime agency employee, having suffered through years of lawsuits, warned a colleague on the Board that, "They're just going to screw you in the end." Even local residents were suspicious early in the process, wondering what this "partnership" was "really up to." But the most difficulty came from the environmentalists.

Environmental constituents continuously hindered or resisted the process, though from their point of view, for good reason. After a year or so, all of Headwaters' meetings were dominated by internal disagreement about Partnership activity. Chris Bratt, one of the original and founding members of Headwaters, was in conflict with various staffers. Jack Shipley, a Headwaters vice-president yet a relative newcomer, was increasingly viewed with suspicion. When the Partnership was wrestling with the specifics of its first group-approved timber sale, "Partnership One," Headwaters was the least compromising constituency and the slowest to sign off (though they did publicly support the sale). Because of their
internal difficulties, triggered by their involvement, eventually Headwaters officially withdrew from the Partnership. This provoked another crisis for the Board. After much discussion and internal soul-searching, it was decided that Chris and Jack would stay in the Partnership as representatives of different, smaller environmental organizations to which they each belonged. This freed them up from the additional time and inherent difficulties required in communicating ideas between an especially careful Headwaters and the Partnership Board.

Within the broader environmental community, the representative-constituency relationship faced other regular challenges. At a Western Ancient Forest Conference, hosted by Headwaters, some environmentalists wore buttons with a "No AMA" symbol (playing on the Partnership's "No They" button). A second example emerged during an environmental law conference, held at the University of Oregon (two hundred miles north of the Applegate). Jack and Brett were on a panel that degenerated into an attack-counterattack episode pitting the two of them against some environmentalist audience members. The public acrimony was a significant moment for both Board members. Brett later expressed deep concern about the exchange. Jack said afterward that he was beginning to feel more comfortable with Partnership Board members, previous adversaries, than he did with his own constituent friends and assumed allies.

In addition to the crises caused by FACA and the Headwaters withdrawal, there was another constituency-inspired Partnership calamity. After the Partnership approved "Partnership One," the Forest Service assumed it had sufficient public support for implementation. They did in fact have Headwaters' favorable recommendation. However, two other environmental organizations, the local Siskiyou Regional Education Project and the regional Oregon Natural Resource Council, filed a lawsuit that held up the sale; the suit alleged inadequate environmental analysis. Of course, this type of constituent activity angered Partnership members and served to further strengthen their new alliance.

We will discuss further the implications of constituent-Partnership relations in the "Lessons" section. For now we turn to the issue of "power."

Power

A number of writers (e.g., Crowfoot & Wondolleck, 1990; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987; Gray, 1989) address difficulties that asymmetrical relationships can create for partnering groups. They discuss how motivation to participate is affected, how low power parties can develop countervailing power and

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12 There was an attempt to "talk things through," as one co-Board member put it, with representatives from these groups, and one representative made a site visit. However, for a number of reasons, not important here, these efforts did not dissuade them from suing.
what can be accomplished in spite of continued power inequity. Yet little is said about how high power contributes to constituency behavior, at best characterized as resistance, at worst translated as subversive.

In the early days of the Partnership, the environmental constituents were the most resistant to the process, partially as a result of their recently achieved high power position. After the spotted owl rulings of the late eighties and early nineties, the environmentalists found themselves in a new role: "They're in the catbird seat these days," said one agency staffperson, referring to the environmental contingent. "The only reason timber people are at the [Partnership] table is because they don't have another choice."

However, the scene soon shifted.

By mid-1994, some environmental constituents began advocating the dissolution of the Partnership, "now that the agencies are going to have to obey the law." Yet after the elections that November, when Republicans captured majorities in both the House and Senate, power started shifting back to the industry. Congress, including senators and representatives from Oregon and Washington, was initiating forestry legislation that would preclude future litigation, loosen existing regulations and open forests to increased "salvage" logging. Within weeks it was the timber constituency that was talking tough, reconsidering participation in the Partnership. Sharla warned that she no longer knew how long SOTIA would support Partnership activity without more visible results (successful timber sales). "They're wanting me to spend more of my time doing other things." Dwain reconsidered the time he was putting into the Partnership.

But the fact that power can shift so quickly can serve as an implicit argument for the longterm utility or viability of partnerships and collaborations. In this case, prior to the 1994 elections, environmental representatives had to push through their constituent’s resistance. They stayed at the table because of their sense of community, their commitment to the Partnership and their belief in its vision. Their tenacity was repaid when, even after the elections, timber representatives chose to continue with the Partnership. As Dwain eventually said, "Just because we have more of our boys in Congress doesn't mean I desert." Sharla convinced her people to allow her to stay at the table as well.

Media

We noted earlier how the Partnership deliberately kept media personnel away from the process. Wondelleck & Yaffee (1994) report that decision contributed to the building of trust and eventual success (1-3,1-4). Interestingly, the Partnership would have continued their "undercover" work for an even longer period of time were it not for Interior Secretary Bruce Babbit’s interest in coming to visit the group; they knew that their cover would soon be blown. So they carefully announced their work to various local and regional press personnel. This fits with Carpenter & Kennedy’s (1988) suggestion that groups use the
press to their advantage and make an "asset" of the news media (pp. 182-186). However, things did not go perfectly in this arena.

Though the initial set of regional and local articles on the Partnership were positive and fit with Partnership goals (e.g. Durbin, February 14, 1993; Fattig, February 14, 1993a; Fattig, February 14, 1993b), at least two significant media-related concerns emerged over time. The first issue emerged within the six months or so after "coming out" to the press. While some Partnership members believed that press coverage was beneficial, and while some members enjoyed the notoriety and attention, others began to question the nature of the press relations. Partnership "ambassadors" were speaking at all sorts of forums (e.g., in Washington, D.C. to low and high level officials, including department heads and congresspersons; to other partnership groups; to various gatherings at colleges and universities; at conferences and agency meetings; etc.). When they spoke, they mainly addressed what made the Partnership so successful. But living up to their own press became an issue of concern. They began to develop what one member called "performance anxiety" as a result of their image of success. This issue then dovetailed with the related complaint from some Board members that others were gone too often; that there was too much promotion and not enough work; that member availability was compromised because of these visits and media attention. The Partnership had to set aside time to talk all this out and reach agreements about limiting media relations and Partnership promotion. It was not an easy problem to resolve.

The second concern derived from one concrete event, Headwaters withdrawal from the Partnership. When the press got hold of it, newspaper articles "sensationalized" the issue, making it seem as if the Partnership were falling apart (e.g., Applegate Partner Departs, April 7, 1994; Durbin, April 6, 1994; Fattig, April 2, 1994). Letters to the editor from Rolle, Moffet and others helped clarify, but could not compete with the previous front page headlines. (Months later, acquaintances and colleagues of ours were still surprised to learn that the Partnership had not disbanded. Even a year later, the new Ashland District Ranger was misquoted as having had participated in the "now defunct" Applegate Partnership.)

We will discuss the media further in the "lessons" section. We now turn to our second task, describing the community context in which the Applegate Partnership took place.
COMMUNITY CONTEXT

We have given up the understanding—dropped it out of our language and so out of our thought—that we and our country create one another, depend on one another, are literally part of one another... (Berry, 1977, p. 22).

Introduction

In the first part of this section we describe "the Applegate" with an eye toward discovering the community attributes significant to the beginning and sustaining of the Partnership. The social, economic and political context of the community is important to understand, as are its surrounding region, the social networks and collective dynamics which have contributed to the emergence of the Partnership. After describing the Applegate as a community in transition, we identify and analyze some of the ways in which diversity, economic ties to regional centers and history of political activism contribute to the emergence, continuation and change in the Partnership. In both parts, we will make use of a distinction between community of place and community of interest or affiliation (Kemmis, 1990; Machlis and Force, 1988). We will argue that community-based partnerships are working toward returning the focus to place, shifting it back from interest groups that have become increasingly relevant to localities as more decisions concerning environment and land management are influenced by these geographically dispersed but socially well-integrated regional and national groups. This tension between place and interest is well understood in the Applegate, and many Partnership members are committed to "re-creating" community of place—both shifting their own commitment from interest group to place and moving the locus of decision-making back to the community. This is clear in the initial "vision" statement, in the effort to concentrate on representing common interests rather than organizational affiliation, and in the more recent more specific efforts to "build" community, as in the community outreach efforts and the watershed council (discussed below).

Community in areas such as the Applegate is best defined as "locality-based identity" (Kusel, 1995). Most definitions of community describe two components: territorial and relational. Territorial refers to location, usually in terms of its institutions: local government units, school districts, sources of employment and services, etc. Relational "points to the quality of character of human relationships ... the ways in which group members cooperate and conflict--to the existence or absence of bonds of similarity and sympathy, to what unites or differentiates a collectivity of people" (Gusfield, 1975, xvi). Community
in rural, resource-rich areas includes "sense of place," as landscape serves as an important spatial basis of rural identity, grounding social relationships (Fitchen, 1991) and identifying concrete common grounds for public life (Kemmis, 1990). We will discuss later in this section the importance of "place" for mobilizing collective action by the Partnership.

We will also make use, at times, of three other somewhat distinct dimensions of community: 1) community as geographic area (place), 2) community as a local social system (group interrelationships) and 3) community as a type of relationship (personal networks) (Lee, Field and Burch, 1990; Society of American Foresters 1989). We have found that Partnership Board members often think about community in ways embodying all three of these elements.

Community as geographic area might include a community defined by ridges or creeks (such as the Middle Applegate or Thompson Creek). Often it is defined by settlement name (of which there are eight, none incorporated: Ruch, McKee Bridge, Applegate, Provolt, Williams, Murphy, Wilderville and Wonder). And, for descriptive statistical purposes, community can be delineated by census block (of which there are twelve).

Community as social system can be defined as neighborhood, units defined other than by geographic boundaries in which people feel interdependent and with which they identify. Five neighborhoods have been identified in the Applegate: Upper Applegate, Applegate, Williams, and Murphy and Wilderville (Preister, 1994). Community as social system can also be seen as the structure and integration of the local version of society (Nelson, 1960). In this case, community may extend to nearby towns which meet social needs through economic employment, county services, cultural opportunities, etc. The two counties spanned by the Applegate Community serve many of these needs, often funding them with revenue from public lands (O&C receipts represent a sizeable, yet shrinking, portion of the county budgets). One county's central city (Medford) is large enough that the county is designated as a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area; ironically, then, portions of the "rural" Applegate are actually in an urban county. Finally, community as social system also extends to people who feel very much a part of the Applegate community but return to homes elsewhere, at night or during parts of the year.

Community as relationship or the "community field" (Kaufman, 1959; Wilkinson, 1991) relates to the "quest for community" (Nisbet, 1953), as residents express their common interest in the local society, seeking shared meaning and collective well-being. Often this takes place in casual settings such as the Ruch Cafe and McKee Bridge store, more formally at the Provolt Community Church, Applegate Lions and volunteer fire departments, and, of course, in community citizen advisory committees and watershed protection associations.
A Community in Transition: Changes in Social Systems, Values and Relationships

The Applegate Valley community is similar to many rural resource-dependent communities in transition. Its region is undergoing economic and demographic flux: traditional employment sectors are declining, urban retirees and equity migrants seeking rural lifestyles are moving to the area, and local youth are leaving for opportunities elsewhere. Transfer payments account for a sizable portion of local personal income and the poverty rate exceeds that in the counties of which it is part (Reid and Mattson, 1993; Oregon Employment Division, 1992).

In the greater region, trades, service and construction employment is and many residents commute (or move) to these economic opportunities. Employment in traditional sectors such as agriculture, forestry and fishing is also rising in the two-county region (Oregon Employment Division, 1992) and the Applegate shows an even higher percentage of its employment in these areas (Reid and Mattson, 1993). Much of this employment is related to the growing number of nurseries, pear orchards, and wineries in the area; still, many ranchers and farmers support their enterprises with second jobs in nearby cities.

Since the seventies, urban migrants have been attracted to the area because of its quality of life: aesthetic amenities, recreational opportunities, safety, and slower-paced life. The two surrounding counties, Jackson and Josephine, grew by 10.5 and 6.4%, respectively between 1980-90 (Preister, 1994). (Data are not available for the Applegate watershed.) These figures represent net migration; in migration, is considerably larger, but partially counterbalanced by the out migration of others. Immigrants (known also as "reverse migrants" as most previous moves had been from rural to urban areas, cf., Blahna, 1990) are much like those moving into rural areas throughout the country during this period. Newcomers to the Applegate come mostly from urban areas. They tend to be older, retired couples or relatively younger families; most are more affluent. Such newcomers often act as "advocates of change" as they bring political competencies, as well as expectations for what constitutes the "good life" (Schwarzweller, 1979; Lee, 1991a; Brown, 1995). This is certainly true in the Applegate.

But images of the good life vary considerably. Such changes in the socio-economic base and political arena are not always supported by rural residents, and newcomers’ attitudes and behaviors can appear judgmental and contemptuous of rural culture. Additionally, requests for additional services can increase in local taxes and stress on existing resources. This cultural conflict is often discussed in community research, an early example being Dillman and Trembly who state:

Even modest increases for communities ... now populated by homogeneous long-term residents, are likely to have dramatic impacts. New residents with city bred beliefs are likely to question the values of long-term residents and even their cherished ways of getting things done. Conflict may
well be the result of sudden increases in heterogeneity (in Blahna, 1990, p. 160).

While Blahna suggests that this is a hypothesis requiring verification, local research documents this cultural conflict. Two different qualitative studies serve as examples:

Several of my [the researcher's] interview subjects complained about the comments popular among the newcomers.... Casual jokes about how backward and reactionary the locals are can be heard in any crowd of non-locals. I heard a typical one just the other day when a friend said she just didn't want to go to a meeting where she had to "hear the yokels yammering away about jobs" (Brown, 1991).

Oldtimers have pragmatic attitudes about their surroundings. It is a typical Oregon scene to have a rusted-out vehicle next to a mobile home, next to a modular home, next to a custom home. A newcomer is talking when one hears a comment like, "I wish ______ would clean his place up; it looks terrible!" (Preister, 1994)

Another theme is related to newcomers "not getting it" -- not taking the time to figure out how things work. Not only do "they want to keep everything green" and "make us a park for Portland" ... but "they are out of touch with the land." ... The coup-de-grace, however, is that not only are they out of touch, but "they want to take charge", and "they stir it up too much", and "they want to change everything!" (Preister, 1994)

Preister suggests that there is little evidence that newcomers have "taken over," yet tension is created by their style of community involvement.

The root of much of this cultural conflict is class and status difference. Most recent waves of newcomers come with economic assets (often from the sale of property in California - hence, the name "equity migrants") and human resource strengths (e.g., education and training). Many locals thus experience the economic consequences of the impact of these visitors: rising property values, competition for existing jobs and markets, and restricted access to public and private lands and natural resources. For example, a Partnership Board member, in order to stay on the farm settled by her grandfather, sold a prime riverfront section; friends and neighbors accustomed to crossing this land lost access. More subtle, but perhaps even more significant, effects of status differences are the symbolic statements about personal value and worth that people display with their consumption and lifestyle. Notable are the houses with walls around their one acre "front yards."

Yet, newcomers are also an asset to rural communities in transition. They contribute their skills and knowledge to the local economy, bringing financial resources, experience and businesses with them, and add to the consumer markets in terms of new housing construction and business expansion (Bradshaw
and Blakely, 1979). They are active politically and bring new blood to civic organizations (Shands, 1991). Newcomers (and "midtimers" (Preister, 1994)) have added social capital and economic vitality to the Applegate.

Midtimers ... are in leadership positions in many of the small communities. These are individuals who are often cited when asked who we should be talking to about community issues, or they take the lead in addressing community issues, such as the McKee Bridge restoration, resistance to the soil remediation facility in Murphy, and the Ruch effort to develop a community center (Preister, 1994).

It is significant to note that newcomers and midtimers were largely responsible for the birth of the Partnership and comprised a large proportion of the original board.

With regard to infrastructure, since there are no incorporated towns, there are no elected local offices in the Applegate. Therefore, local infrastructure is limited to the ranger station, fire departments, schools and churches. Some services are either currently available or soon to be delivered through satellite offices of nearby centers; however, some of these (e.g., the sheriff's outpost) are regarded by (some) residents as unwarranted intrusions into community self-reliance or easily accessible by car in the nearby cities (e.g., a proposed health clinic). Residents either secure most services outside the local community (as is typical for rural communities, Little and Krannich 1989) or make do with local services and informal means to care for one another (Preister, 1994).

Like most rural communities, the Applegate is connected through vertical linkages (Warren, 1978) to external, metropolitan centers. Local autonomy has been lost in a number of arenas such as school consolidation, absentee ownership and concentration of ranches and timberland, and political decisions made upstate and back east. As in forest communities throughout the Northwest, decisions about natural resources are often made elsewhere. Recent policy shifts in public land management and instability in the timber industry are significant in and of themselves, but compounded by the cumulative effects of cultural change, limited access to forest resources and recreation on private and public land, rise in the cost of living in rural areas and diminishing funding for local services.

The Unique Social Structure of the Applegate Setting

While we have shown that the community context of the Applegate Partnership is similar, in some important ways, to rural resource dependent communities, there are some significant differences. Studies of rural communities experiencing similar economic and social transitions describe them as being vulnerable to economic and political change and incapable of reacting to problems associated with growth or decline, "let alone to act in any organized, proactive manner" (FEMAT, 1993, p. VII-45). Studies of
timber communities suggest that personal and social stress are consequences of changes in forest policy which is also responsible for vilification of loggers, social dislocation and alienation (Lee, 1991b; Carroll and Lee, 1990). Interface communities--those places where residential settlements and forests meet--generally are said to be threatened by changes in land ownership and social composition which undermine "the long-term integrity and traditional uses of land" (Bradley, 1986; Shands, 1991).

Why did a group of people concerned about the Applegate come together, not only to pursue self-interest, but to protect a common value and to enter into "civic conversation" (Shannon, 1991)? How could some people from such divergent and conflicting segments within a community in transition gather around the table as equals and work with others living outside of it (but strongly identified with it in their personal interests and professional work) for the good of the collective?

We believe that the community's social and economic diversity, along with social and environmental activism in an organizational setting of tolerance and progressivism, combined to sustain the individual initiatives that created the Partnership. In its economic and social transition, key groups have recognized the value of natural resource utilization and the importance of protection, and they are willing to come together to preserve both for community stability and well-being. The following sections discuss the specific elements of the community context which are considered to be significant to the Partnership formation and continuation.

**Change and its Community Consequences: Diversity as a Catalyst**

For decades, the Applegate has experienced widespread and continuous changes, not simply sudden alterations caused by isolated public policies, economic trends or demographic processes. The effects of change have not affected local residents equally. While some families have been able to take advantage of new economic opportunities and rising values of their property and services, other families have been left behind or forced to leave. While some have joined efforts to revitalize the community and protect environmental amenities, many remain disaffected and distrustful of strangers invading their place. Others have joined the effort to proactively save what's left of cherished places, values and ways of life. New services, community centers and organizations are becoming available; yet, institutions, livelihoods, property and traditions have been lost. A Board member explains her personal incentives for involvement in the Partnership as protecting not only natural resources, but a way of life:

I've always been what this community considers a redneck; my family has always been involved in farming, and logging and the timber industry. We've always taken a real firm stand about protecting our natural resources, but that was our living, the natural resources. And it has been for five generations.
To protect our way of life--we felt that these outsiders who were moving in were trying to change us and take it over and it's hard for us to release that feeling and to make room for them to live here and to not feel the resentments. I still know so many people that really feel the resentment of outsiders moving in and pushing their way in saying, "you're going to have to change the way you look at things" (Connie Young, personal interview, 1995).

Social and economic dislocation for some is even more difficult in the face of increased prosperity and consumption for others. Traditional community social systems and caretaking networks have stretched to meet these needs, but some churches, schools and family networks have themselves been changed or lost during the transformation. This has not gone unnoticed; poverty and stress in the Applegate are not "invisible," even to newcomers and environmentalists who have been accused of putting their self-interests or "a-social" environmentalism first (Carroll and Lee, 1990). Through community networks and gathering places, newcomers and environmentalists have personal relationships with those displaced by changes in resource policy and economics in the region. Local, social and personal problems threaten the community stability sought by individuals fleeing urban poverty, crime, and other urban pressures. But human recognition, sometimes at the face-to-face level of such local stresses, can be an additional motivator of collective action to build community participation and stability.

The social diversity of the area, with its different waves of migrants and different occupational and residential communities, has contributed to a sense of tolerance for differing values and life-styles. Multiple disputes among differing groups (e.g., between local farmers and hippies over the Barter Faire, between local Ruch community members and the ever-expanding Applegate Christian Fellowship, between residents and local rock quarry owners) have demonstrated that conflict is ubiquitous and multi-dimensional. The many "social-vaccinations" (Goffman, 1961) from clashes over lifestyles, land-use changes and economic shifts have immunized the community and created multiple sources of resistance, coalitions, and cooperation as in various Partnership community-building activities. This has proven to be especially important to the Partnership's continuation during the prolonged period of inability to implement even agreed-upon timber sales.

This is not to say that environmental issues are not a principle source of conflict in the Valley. They are, and environmentalists are aware of how this conflict has split the community. Watershed protection groups, in networking meetings, discuss the importance of gaining community support for their

13 Another type of refugee is one who flees a rural community overcome by urbanites: an example being an Applegate Partnership Board member, originally from California, who fled to Oregon from a rural community in Utah "a place that's been ruined by yuppies from California, and their bicycles and spandex."
agenda, the insensitivity of telling displaced timber workers to "retrain and relocate" and the elitism of a vision of a future based on tourism and service industries (Durbin, 1993b; Sturtevant, 1993).

Environmental organization members include children of labor workers, card-carrying union members (often in carpentry or construction), unemployed or disenchanted timber workers, and leftists ("60's people") with an affinity for the labor movement and proclaim a shared ethic of social justice. Both environmentalists and newcomers seeking to "re-create" community care about people as well as ecosystems, and they acknowledge the links between healthy communities, stable local timber industries and healthy forests.

In writing about the resources recent migrants bring to rural areas in California, Bradshaw and Blakely (n.d.) identify five different kinds of communities and their accompanying migrant streams: county seat and trade centers, professional university communities, retirement communities, tourist communities and counterculture communities. While they stress the variations between these communities, it is notable that the Applegate community encompasses in some manner all five types. While county seat, trade center and professional university activities do not occur in the Valley, itself, many employed in these areas commute to homes in the Applegate and identify with the place. Certainly, retirement, tourism and counterculture are part of the community's social transition. These different occupational and cultural communities combine to contribute to the complexity and richness of the Applegate community.

**Local Leadership and Community Capacity: Necessary Ingredients**

The social change and diversity just described as strengths of the Applegate community are related to its leadership, social networks, and community capacity. We would argue that community capacity--the collective ability of residents in the community to respond to change--has allowed the Applegate to capitalize on the positive dimensions of socio-economic and demographic changes and absorb social stressors created by these trends and changes in land management and ownership patterns. Community capacity involves three broad areas: 1) physical capital or infrastructure (sewer systems, business parks, housing stock); 2) human capital or resources (skills, education, and knowledge) and 3) social capital (collective action) (FEMAT, 1993; Kusel, 1995). Social capital is one of the most important components of community capacity (Kusel, 1995) and the most significant to the Partnership's formation as it is related to the community's level of public participation activity (Putnam, 1995) and entrepreneurial social infrastructure (Flora and Flora, 1991).

"Social capital"--in contrast to economic capital which is inaccessible to many rural localities--refers to "features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1995). Flora and Flora expand on "social
capital" with their concept "entrepreneurial social infrastructure" (ESI). ESI is composed of three elements: symbolic diversity, resource mobilization and quality of networks. These elements are dynamic, interactive, process dimensions of social organization and change over time. Symbolic diversity involves an orientation toward inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness.

Instead of fostering perverse conflict or superficial harmony, symbolic diversity inspires communities to engage in constructive controversy to arrive at workable community decisions by focusing on community processes, depersonalization of politics, and broadening of community boundaries (Flora and Flora, 1993).

As we have argued above, the diversity in the Applegate community allows it to engage in constructive controversy while including varying lifestyles and beliefs.

Resource mobilization involves generating resources within the community beyond those needed for basic subsistence and a willingness to invest in collective improvement. The diversity of the economy and relative affluence of many Applegate residents have alleviated dependence on a single family or employer; a range of different kinds of resources is willingly invested into local communal efforts (such as the community center, support for the Applegator, and restoration of the McKee Bridge).

A network is "a value-based, spread-out, process-oriented, multicentered social form" (Lipnack and Stamps, 1986) which can mobilize individuals and groups to address shared problems. Networks facilitate the flow of resources, particularly mutual aid and information. Network diversity allows leadership to be spread broadly, and allows a range of voices and ideas to be employed in innovative strategies. Quality networks are horizontally linked to allow learning from similar groups, and vertically linked to gain resources, gather and provide information.

Like many rural communities, networks in the Applegate range from the informal (kinship, friend and neighborhood support systems) to grassroots organizations (community improvement, environmental, community churches) to formal organizations (Elks, Grange Historical Society, Applegate Christian Fellowship). These networks in the Applegate are dense and have a number of points of overlap with one another, as well as with other networks in the region. These multiple, diverse and dense networks contribute to the overall capacity of the community. Some (primarily environmental groups, as described below) were directly involved in the formation of the Applegate Partnership and many are called upon in its current outreach efforts.

A "midtimer" group networked into the leadership of the community is composed of "back-to-the-landers" who brought with them experience in social activism and community organization which reached beyond the resources of traditional rural communities (Knott, personal communication, 1995).
Back-to-the-landers or alternative community members\textsuperscript{14} share with long-time residents a close association with the land, self-sufficiency values and distrust of government (Preister, 1994). While their appearance and outlook initially threatened local culture, this first group of then-newcomers contributed either as laborers or volunteers to address needs of local residents (at one time comprising 50\% of the volunteer firefighter force (Preister, 1994)). Some of the core leadership of the Partnership harkens back to the 60's social activism era.

Other community networks include residents with great indigenous and technical knowledge about resource management. Many ranchers and small woodland owners have land which has passed through many generations of active, but careful management. Many newcomers\textsuperscript{15} bring technical expertise and ambition to their land. Inspired by partnership members, some neighborhoods have formed networks of property owners who call on local and external expertise in managing their small woodlands and coordinate planning in recognition that only by working together can they achieve their overall landscape goals.

Community resources, in addition to time and money, include the knowledge of retired engineers and other technical entrepreneurs in the Valley. They are willing to study scientific documents and resource plans and help others take their concerns to the source; "reverse migrants" are familiar with land use planning and regulations and see them as a way to stem growth and environmental degradation (Sturtevant, 1989). Grass-roots environmental leadership taps mostly the newcomer knowledge and concern; the Partnership has brought in the more traditional resource management leadership and recognizes the importance of working with the community's informal, but significant, leadership networks.

**Non-Governmental Organizations: Contributing Leadership, Expertise and Resources**

The Partnership draws upon the resources and credibility of a range of local non-profit, non-governmental organizations. The Southern Oregon Timber Association (SOTIA), the Rogue Institute for Ecology and Economy (RIEE), the Farm Bureau and Headwaters bring a balance of interest groups to the table.\textsuperscript{16} These groups provide not only representatives to the Board who have histories of local resource and conservation activism, but have established relationships (in both collaboration and conflict) with...

\textsuperscript{14}There is sensitivity to being called "counter culture" as many of these local residents have been working at bridging with the larger community (Preister, 1994).

\textsuperscript{15}One can have lived in the Valley for as long as 20 years and still be considered a newcomer, although most have lived there for less than 10 years.

\textsuperscript{16}Description of these organizations is listed, by name, in the glossary.
public agencies. None of these groups is located in the Applegate Valley; SOTIA and RIEE representatives to the Board do not live in the Applegate. However, many of their constituents are local, issues of importance to the Partnership figure in their missions and they deem the ground-breaking activity of the Partnership worthy of considerable investment. As the section on group dynamics showed, they are also there to protect (and further) their own interests.

Cabarle and Heiner (1994) list a number of possible contributions by NGO’s to economic and social development: community mobilization, innovation, integrated approaches, extension of government aid, information-gathering and applied research, and policy advocacy. Each is presented below, with examples from the Partnership.

**Community mobilization**

An early goal of the Partnership, this is especially important as efforts directed toward improving forest and community sustainability are so all-inclusive. There are no other local organizations in the Valley which promote “locally based, participatory programs that directly benefit economically or socially marginalized groups” (Cabarle and Heiner, 1994, p.10). Through its social assessment and outreach efforts, RIEE works with the Partnership in building community capacity. Although churches traditionally play a social integration role in rural communities, the Valley is large and its churches are small, with the exception of the Applegate Christian Fellowship.

**Innovation**

Many in the Partnership have been involved in innovative science, management and policy input, as has already been noted. The Rogue Institute has done cutting-edge work in special forest product inventories and density management in the Applegate, among other efforts involving community outreach. Due to federal regulations, this work has been on private lands, even though much of the funding for these experiments has come from Jobs in the Woods funding. Members of SOTIA have offered innovation in fire salvage, reforestation and ecologically sensitive harvesting. Members of the Partnership have taken field trips to some of these sites and learning from these management experiments contributes to planning on federal lands. Headwaters contributes scientific expertise in forest monitoring and evaluation projects. Though Headwaters may not have strongly defended Partnership One timber sale when it was appealed by regional environmental groups, the project incorporated a number of Headwaters’ innovations and values.17

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17Although officially withdrawn from the Partnership board, Headwaters continues to work in various capacities with the Partnership and federal agencies. The organization expresses both concerns and support for timber sales and other management activities at the Partnership table, in Headwaters publications, and in other forums.
Integrated approaches

The Watershed Council\textsuperscript{18} successfully brings together various jurisdictional groups (schools, federal, state and county agencies) and interested community residents in addressing watershed issues on private lands. The current outreach and education project, funded by the State Watershed Management Group (SWMG) and contracted with RIEE, employs local citizens to gather ideas from local citizens as to how they might foster community-based integrated restoration and stewardship projects. Through bringing together a number of special interest groups, the Partnership and Watershed Council, with the help of RIEE, serve important integrative functions for the community and state and federal agencies. They provide evidence for Caberle and Heiner's assertion that:

NGOs that operate at the local level are typically less hindered by the sectoral approach of specialized agencies, which often focus on a single issue ... isolated from its broader context and its links to other environmental, social, or economic forces. NGOs frequently demonstrate greater flexibility in designing and adapting integrated programs to address the full range of local needs (p. 10).

Extension of government aid

Headwaters and RIEE have received private and federal funding to carry out activities in areas where government agencies can not or have not ventured. In addition to monitoring and ecological research, Headwaters and RIEE have sponsored regional gatherings in which Partnership work has been highlighted and facilitated (e.g., a Partnership Conference and Funders' Gathering). The Rogue Institute has received over $150,000 in public and private funding in support of its efforts associated with the Partnership (primarily the social assessment and community outreach efforts).

No federal funding goes directly to the Partnership, although it is added indirectly through grants such as a PNW research contract awarded to the Aerial Forestry Foundation. State funding supports the work of the Applegate Watershed Council. Otherwise, sales of buttons and a video of the Partnership provide ongoing funds.

Information-gathering and applied research

In addition to information and research generation mentioned above, the Partnership has sponsored visits from interested university faculty and graduate students and Oregon State University (OSU) has initiated discussion concerning a potential local research institute. The Rogue Institute cooperated with Southern Oregon State College (SOSC) in disaggregating census data for the Partnership's social

\textsuperscript{18}Members of the Council are the same as the Applegate Partnership Board. See glossary for explanation.
assessment. The Aerial Forestry Foundation helped facilitate a proposal submitted by OSU researchers to Pacific Northwest Research Station for collecting and digitizing forest canopy data gathered from ultralight planes. Academics from throughout the country (and world) who contact or visit the Partnership are often hosted by RIEE or SOSC.19

Policy advocacy

Headwaters, with its organizational expertise in ecology and environmental policy, serves an important "watchdog" role, monitoring the effects and legal implications of projects and policies supported by the Partnership and local agencies. While sometimes frustrating to many in the Partnership, the group's research and response to controversial issues serves as a reminder of community interests not actively represented on the Board. Partnership members (including agencies) have accommodated Headwaters' concerns, partly in hopes that Headwaters' collaboration would avert legal challenges from other environmental communities. Since its withdrawal and ONRC's appeal of Partnership I, this has proven not to be the case. Nevertheless, while Headwaters has only rarely defended or promoted the Partnership and its projects in the wider environmental community, a spokesperson says it has refrained from publicly undermining its efforts.

SOTIA serves as an important advocate for timber interests and forcefully explains and interprets the impact of policies upon the local industry and workers. It has also helped shape the Partnership's positions regarding forest health, particularly as related to potential catastrophic wild fires, and informs the Partnership of lobbying efforts and legal action at the national level. The Farm Bureau, through its representation on the Partnership Board, promotes rancher and farmer interests in the watershed. It has aided the Partnership in its efforts to preserve local resource communities, particularly through articles in The Applegator and, most recently, in discussions with the Governor Kitzhaber during his visit to the Partnership.

Additional contributions

Local organizations contribute in other ways to the Partnership. Headwaters, SOTIA and RIEE have networked with similar organizations throughout the region, reaching individual watershed groups, employers and individuals in the valley with interests or resources relevant to particular issues. The executive directors of SOTIA and RIEE bring their organizational leadership experience and skills to the...
Partnership Board. They have used regional and national meetings as forums for publicizing Partnership activities and ideals. NGO interest in the Partnership has contributed to the empowerment of Board members and provided personal incentives for participation. Partnership activities are often reported at different NGO meetings and their representatives are personally supported and praised for their efforts on behalf of both the organization and Partnership. This plurality of organizational interests and representatives on the Partnership Board brings a diversity of resources, perspectives and insights to complex resource management and community development issues, broadening the base of support and scope of outreach, and increasing the responsiveness and accountability of participating governmental agencies.

This is not to say that there are no costs of NGO participation. Organizations, themselves, have incurred great expense in their participation on the board. First, affiliation with the Partnership raises issues of legitimacy with organizational constituents. Headwaters' resignation from the Board arose from difficulties of accountability to the environmental community, as discussed above. SOTIA's participation has been questioned by some of its members who scoff at the inability of the Partnership to increase timber output. They have to deal with fears that interests of the organizations are being coopted in the interest of consensus, that they have become nothing more than "window dressing" for the agencies. Second, executive directors of both SOTIA and RIEE have to defend to their boards of directors the time commitment they devote to the Partnership Board in the face of increasing organizational responsibilities outside the Applegate. Their attendance is beginning to wane, although the Partnership still relies upon their talents, skills and networks. Finally, some NGOs have mixed responses to the Partnership's increased community involvement: while RIEE sees this involvement as an opportunity to wean the Partnership from its dependency on outside organizational leadership, SOTIA sees some community issues as detracting from its own organizational goals and diminishing its incentives for such tremendous investment.20

While the NGOs contribute to the Partnership through their common interest in identifying the links between the economy, environment and community well-being, their missions are varied, their motivations complex and sometimes their interests clash or are called into question. (For example, the Aerial Forestry Foundation's recently proposed watershed EIS and management contract was accused by some of furthering outside rather than community interests.) NGO leaders have not yet used their

20At a recent Board meeting, the SOTIA executive director announced that mills were closing and laying off workers--"serious things are happening"--and that board members of her organization wanted to come to the Partnership to "see where the train is going ... if it is buying anything."
resources and talents to further interests contrary to the Partnership goals and the group processes have fostered leaders who would not likely allow this to happen.

**Attachment to Place and Local Natural Resources**

Residents of the Applegate valley are attached to the place. They share a sense of local ownership of resources, even though most are owned by the government or large industries. They use the forests, land and water, whether as sources of employment, subsistence, recreation or aesthetics. Their personal pride and attachment to the resources are incentives to spend the time and energy necessary to work toward sound planning and management. The significance of physical features of environmental settings and socially constructed meanings of these landscapes should not be underestimated.

Our understandings of nature and of human relationships with the environment are really cultural expressions used to define who we were, who we are, and who we hope to be at this place and in this space. Landscapes are the reflection of these cultural identities, which are about us, rather than the natural environment. When attempting to identify and understand the potential human consequences of changes in the natural environment, it is imperative that these consequences are understood from the many cultural definitions that create landscapes (Greider and Garkovich 1994:2).

In the Applegate, the cultural definitions of place vary. For some, such as the "lone-eagle" who seeks solitude and inspiration the meaning of place is purely personal; to others, such as the rancher and logger, it is occupational as well. Whether attachment to place is linked to extraction, ecology or recreation, much of it is subjective and symbolic, and defined socially at a fairly abstract level. The Applegate is said to have a "spirit of place" which is discovered by people who live and work in the Valley (Smelcer, personal interview); this spirit binds them to a common legacy and a commitment to the future (Kemmis, 1990). It is a key contributor to the individual and collective well-being of those living in the Applegate and serves to mobilize their participation in decisions concerning management and protection.

There are high levels of public awareness about environmental issues. Not only do residents feel the threat of climatic change and catastrophic fire, they consider their forests to be at risk of

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21 Sense of local ownership of the resource and level of resource use were contextual factors found to foster public participation in a community-based water resources program in the Great Lakes Basin (Landre and Knuth, 1993).

22 An example is a community gathering, sponsored by the Partnership, over the water issues. While some people came because of their concern for water rights and/or protection of irrigation rights, and others wanted stream and pool levels maintained for fish, a large number identified themselves as "big-picture people" who care about both irrigation and fish and stream health, their overriding concern being the general health of the watershed and waterways (Boyle, 1995).
mismanagement. Jack Shipley, for instance, while flying above the Cascades on the way to a meeting, exclaimed about the uniqueness of Southwest Oregon, one of the few places with mixed-ownership forests left relatively intact. The environmental problems in the Applegate are manageable, the sources of stream pollution and forest degradation are discoverable and efforts at forest and stream protection have produced tangible results.

There is an expectation that appropriate management will preserve this ecosystem. Individuals within the federal agencies have been able to develop local rapport and build credibility, although it hasn't always been easy. The history of public relations is long and varied, at times ruled by the maxim "as long as all of our public is mad at us, we can consider ourselves to be neutral." While newcomers brought different values and expectations, straining earlier amenable relations with a more traditional utilitarian view of forest management, they also gave "voice" (Fortmann and Kusel, 1990) to oldtimers' worries about clearcutting and stream quality (Sturtevant, 1991). This voice was not ignored by the agencies. One agency won national recognition for its inclusion of interface "neighbor" concerns in its resource management plan. While many feel that public education is the solution (Sturtevant, 1990), a new generation of more environmentally-oriented employees in national agencies (Raphael, 1994) mirror the changing public values. Ecologists and biologists in the agencies contributed research papers to early organizing efforts of the Partnership and two district rangers were instrumental in facilitating its formation.

**Multiple, Overlapping Governmental Jurisdictions as Obstacles and Incentives**

"Civic conversations take place within policy communities that coalesce when social problems do not fit within existing governmental jurisdictions" (Medinger, 1987 in Shannon, 1991). Because there are no incorporated places in the Applegate Valley, the nearest political representatives are county commissioners. Perhaps because the Valley straddles primarily the two counties, its residents feel that neither Board represents them. Most of the Valley's population lies in Josephine County (70%) whose commissioners' attention is oriented towards Grants Pass and the Illinois Valley.

Different agencies (Federal, State and County) have responsibility for land parcels and roads, creating problems for streams, roads and viewsheds that run through these boundaries. Problems fall between the cracks, are passed from one agency to another or get dealt with in conflicting manners. For example, Jan Perttu, a local resident (and current Partnership Board member) found the origin of sediment carried down the Little Applegate to the Applegate River to be a county road no longer maintained after a land exchange between the BLM and USFS (Perttu, 1995). The Watershed Council brought together the

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23 Just within the federal agencies, there are two Forests with three Ranger Districts, and one BLM District with two Resource Areas. The Watershed also includes two states and three counties.
Jackson County Public Works Department, The Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Forest Service and, after a number of "it's not our fault" and "it's not our responsibility" statements, negotiated a joint solution. While some believe jurisdictional complexity discourages public involvement (Landre and Knuth, 1993), locally it has inspired cooperative efforts to solve particular problems.

In conclusion, the Applegate community is unlike other timber resource-based communities which are considered to be more at risk during this period of timber harvest decline (FEMAT, 1993). The local economy has not relied on a single industry as an economic base, it continues to diversify, and the surrounding region provides a range of employment opportunities. The diffuse population in the Valley is bound together in neighborhoods and communities with multiple social institutions and networks providing strong collective definitions of place. Highways which loop (rather than end) link residents to one another and the weather usually allows passage, there is participation in civic life, and the region is expanding its employment opportunities and services. The population is diverse and local activists are well-trained and networked. An ethic of caring still remains.

Community Representation and Outreach

The extent to which the Partnership represents the broad diversity of constituents in the community is a critical issue for the Partnership. How can the Partnership, as a single entity striving towards collaborative management, fairly or adequately represent the total spectrum of interests? To repeat one portion of the Partnership vision:

Through community involvement and education, this partnership supports management of all land within the watershed in a manner that sustains natural resources and that will, in turn, contribute to economic and community stability within the Applegate Valley.

In discussing issues related to community representation, some board members return to this statement of their community outreach and education mission. Others feel that it is more involved, as articulated in the same document:

The Partnership will encourage participation by individuals, landowners, and agencies in developing a desired future condition for the environment and economy of the watershed. The intent is to create trust-exploring ways for the people and organizations to work together positively to share information and solve problems. The Applegate Partnership utilizes its diversity to work together and build coalitions which extend beyond the Partnership and watershed boundaries. The coalitions resulting from the Partnership will provide knowledge and technology in support of ecosystem management.
The Partnership does not see itself as the only entity representing the spectrum of interests related to ecology and economy in the community. Not only does it expect to work with others, such as schools and local watershed protection groups\(^4\), but it seeks to serve as a catalyst for other problem-solving activity. Planning efforts and information meetings for the Applegate Adaptive Management Area are not always a part of regular Partnership meetings and the interagency liaison (AMA coordinator) works to expand public involvement activity beyond the more easily accessible Partnership. (See glossary for discussion of AMA, AMA coordinator and interagency liaison.)

During the past year, the Partnership has been successful in its community outreach and education efforts. For example, it helped spread the word about open houses and field trips sponsored by the agencies. The field trips have been particularly useful for developing agency credibility and demonstrating new directions in management. Partnership members have also taken field trips to nearby industrial lands to view new technology and fire salvage and restoration, expanding respect for industry's ability to enhance forest health.

**Community Assessment Project**

The purpose of the community assessment conducted by the Rogue Institute was to help the Partnership broaden its involvement in the community and to identify community interests, issues and processes. A stated objective was to "help the Partnership understand how the community works so it can anticipate community concerns and improve management decisions" (Preister, 1993, p. 2). Two other objectives were to "improve community participation in planning and implementing forest management in order to gain the support of the community," and to "create jobs, a diversified economy and community improvements consistent with ecosystem management" (p. 3).

Fieldwork for the assessment has identified key leadership networks which have been successfully tapped in agency and Partnership outreach efforts. The research process also served to heighten community interest in the Partnership. Aware that not all affected individuals can or will attend meetings, the Partnership viewed the report as an important alternative means for community members to express their concerns. The report states that it is intended to serve the Partnership "so that their goal of having all the interests on the table will be realized (Preister, 1993, p. 4). Individuals within the agencies have found the community assessment invaluable for understanding community issues and interest groups. Working with the Rogue Institute, they are following up on a group of actions suggested by the

\(^4\)At least one local watershed group has reduced its meeting schedule partly because its leadership is absorbed in Partnership commitments.
The Watershed Council

The Watershed Council (synonymous to the Applegate Partnership, as explained in Appendix A) has had the farthest reaching success in the community, with the most concrete results. It sponsored two large and informative public meetings for community members to bring their concerns about water to representatives from state and federal agencies. These meetings brought together a large and varied number of participants by means of phone trees, the Applegator and networks developed through Council activities. A professional facilitator and the moderator (Jack Shipley), through his example and comments, kept the usual posturing, grandstanding, accusations and competing rhetorics to a minimum.

The Watershed Council has also completed an extensive watershed assessment and submitted a number of proposed projects to the state. While there have been some frustrations with the State's fledgling, bureaucratic process of approving program proposals, outreach by individual council members with local residents and discussion of common riparian issues has lessened many old-timers' suspicion that the Partnership "was just a bunch of preservationists" and has mobilized others to participate. In fact, we would argue that this one-on-one outreach effort, with people interdependently connected by the health of their shared creek, has done the most to gain the support and interest of the community. The Watershed Council has also coordinated local school children and residents in tree planting projects, neutral, "feel-good" community building activities. It has begun to successfully implement riparian restoration projects across private properties.

The Council has built new leadership capacity in the Partnership. Individuals who had not been part of the Partnership core leadership have had opportunities to develop and demonstrate their talents in watershed assessment, project planning, community outreach, newspaper editing, grant writing, and organizational networking.

Board Member Profile

Like others who participate voluntarily in community leadership positions, most Partnership board members are atypical of the community in their levels of education and socio-economic class (Landre and Knuth, 1993). Although residents of the Applegate community are no more educated than the rest of the surrounding counties (Reid and Mattson, 1993), nearly all Board members have college or advanced degrees. They have the training, patience and ability to work through conceptual and technical material

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25 The direct utility of the social assessment for the Partnership or local communities is less apparent, although it lay the foundation for important outreach and community planning efforts. This assessment, as well as the various ecological assessments, is available in local libraries.
and the occupational flexibility to attend meetings and field trips. (Meeting times alternate weekly, one during the day, the other in the evening, so that different community members can attend.) The time commitment is great (at least ten hours per month), but Partnership members feel that working to protect their environment and community is part of the investment involved in living in the Valley. There is little patience for those who say they cannot attend meetings.

A conscious effort has been made to have more community representation on the Board. While the first Board had a majority of its members living outside the community (representing "community of interest" groups and the agencies), the most recent Board composition has shifted to have more representation from the community. Loggers and ranchers have been actively recruited and attend regularly. Still, people are left out and everyone knows that. Recent outreach efforts discovered that people in the community at the Grants Pass end of the Valley were feeling ignored. Summer night meetings have been shifted to sites convenient for these people, and potential recruits have been invited to submit items to the Applegator, as well.

A shared tenet of many forest community partnerships is that they recognize the right of people at a distance to have a say in resource management. Partnership members implicitly recognize the rights of urbanites who don’t live in the Valley, but have an interest in the management of its public lands; however, the Partnership does not support the "no cut" view of some of their urban constituents. Instead they return to their belief in managing for the entire ecosystem, rather than a single resource, within national laws, many of which established in response to pressure from the national constituencies.

The Applegate Partnership began as a diverse group of people who understood that a path through the impasse of forest issue management conflict was to focus on common interest in community and local control. Still, early discussions revolved around timber and forest protection; communities were a subtext, a backdrop. As the Partnership confronts obstacles to achieving its goals of working towards forest health (most notably the appeal of Partnership One and various barriers within the agencies), the community focus fuels its continuation. While some projects have begun and others are completed (most

\[26\] Many moved to the area specifically clean water, air, beauty and safety and in essence paid for these "public values" with reduced earning opportunities.

\[27\] Some members of the Partnership are also active in the Lead Partnership Group which is structuring a conversation with and visit from representatives of national environmental and timber groups to discuss issues and share goals of local community-based forest initiatives.

\[28\] Perhaps this was because member expertise and organizational interests revolved around forest management, since in other ways community was a central organizing principle.
community focus fuels its continuation. While some projects have begun and others are completed (most notably assessments and Watershed Council projects), the importance of process (in contrast to outcome) becomes increasingly apparent. The Partnership has become a way of being rather than a single approach to solving a single set of problems. To quote a local resident doing Watershed Council outreach:

I interviewed an old timer who wants the Partnership to come out and see the work he’s done on his land. It started out that he’s real leery of the Partnership, but now it’s getting into areas that people are interested in. "You started with trees, now you’re getting into social issues. You are becoming an important alternative social process. You have a power. You’re not the government, you’re not there to judge."
SUCCESS

Outcome and Process

To what extent has the Applegate Partnership succeeded? This question can be approached in number of ways; as the FEMAT report noted, "Success, like beauty, is often in the mind of the beholder" (1993, p. VII-106). Here, we have chosen to present a selected overview of how other theorists and practitioners have defined success and in so doing, identify where the Partnership has met or failed to meet those criteria. We list a number of writers including Bingham (1988), Wondolleck and Yaffee (1994), Bush and Folger (1994), Dukes (1994), and Amy (1987). Taken together, and in different ways, these scholars lead us to think of success as having at least two categories, outcomes and processes. One set of authors (Daniels et al., 1994) have divided the process dimension even further, into procedural (group process rules, decision-making, etc.) and relational (group power, authority, and control dynamics). The reader will note from our discussion of success that many of the Partnership's accomplishments fall into the process dimension. We will suggest at the end of this section the structural barriers to achieving apparent tangible action or obvious benefits. While we believe there have been tremendous actions and benefits, those looking for timber output may not agree, nor might those seeking ecological restoration and monitoring, especially on public lands.

Beginning with outcome, and referring to the 161 cases of environmental mediations documented for her study, Bingham writes

the first and most simple measure of how successful these processes have been in resolving the issues is how often agreements have been reached. A second test of how well the agreements reached have resolved the real issues in dispute is the . . . implementation process (p. xx).

Agreements and agreements that are implemented are two tangible outcome indicators.

As of this writing, there have been a variety of significant Applegate projects agreed on and implemented; the community and ecologic assessments are only two of many examples. However, for those measuring success as timber volume, the Partnership has been fully involved in only one sale, Partnership One. No new sales reflecting values of the Partnership have been implemented.29 While there are other sales which are close, waiting in the wings for dissolution of agency or legal impediments, it is

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29 It should be noted that the Partnership recommended a timber sale that had been almost fully developed by the Forest Service, the "Ramsey Thin" sale. The sale was implemented. The Partnership has also offered input on other pending timber sales, one of which—a BLM sale in Tomkins Creek—is almost ready. Agency employees who designed this sale received a standing ovation from the public during a recent tour.
because of this inaction that Board members, both timber representatives and those seeking forest health through density management, regularly express concern with the slow rate of progress. They are extremely frustrated with this lack of outcome as they continue to see mills closing, jobs lost and disillusionment with the future of the local forest products industry, as well as overstocked, fire-prone public lands. There is no way to obviate these specific concerns.

Yet there is more to the issue of success. Bingham also writes:

Other, intangible factors are also likely to be important to parties in disputes. Sometimes, as part of reaching an agreement, and sometimes in spite of not reaching an agreement, the participants report that the process itself was valuable. They may feel they have gained valuable insights into their opposition's point of view on the issues and have created more open lines of communication (p. xxi).

This fits with the later work of Wondolleck & Yaffee (1994) who consider "success" in the two major groupings, outcome and process (p. 37); they add various categories and sub-categories. Though the Partnership can claim success on some of Wondolleck & Yaffee's outcome variables (e.g., "provided a valued public service," or, "fostered public ownership and support for decisions"), their greatest strength so far has been on the process dimensions (e.g., "followed a more cooperative and integrative process," or, "fostered understanding of issues and interests").

Transformation

Folger and Bush (1994) and Dukes (1993) are among a diverse group of scholars (cf. Putnam, 1994) who, following this process theme, suggest that disputes can be viewed as opportunities for transformation. Folger and Bush's "transformative" mediation model (1994) says that conflicts provide an occasion in which there is potential for growth in empowerment and recognition:

Growth in empowerment involves realizing and strengthening one's capacity as an individual for encountering and grappling with adverse circumstances and problems of all kinds. Growth in recognition involves realizing and strengthening one's capacity as an individual for experiencing and expressing concern and consideration for others, especially others whose situation is 'different' from one's own. Growth in both these dimensions is the hallmark of mature human development . . . (p. 15-16).

Dukes' (1993) model of public conflict transformation posits three categories: an engaged community, a responsive governance and a capacity for problem-solving and conflict resolution.

It seems clear to us that it is on these transformative dimensions that the Partnership can claim success. Perhaps the best among many examples empowerment and recognition resides in the interview
we conducted with a board member. She was looking forward to meeting Oregon’s Governor Kitzhaber, who was soon coming to visit the Partnership board. She said:

See, I’m not sure why, I’ve always been a farm-wife you know, and never really had much influence in the community, and it seems since I’ve gotten into the Applegate Partnership, people are asking my opinion on so many things . . .

I love the people we’re involved with. I have become so fond of Chris whom I thought I would never, ever have anything to do with years ago because of his ideas and his stand on things . . . and Jack . . . he was an environmentalist and he was my enemy and that’s just the way I felt about it because of my stand here. [And now, the fact that we can] sit down and talk about all these things that hold our future, you know, right here, in this community and in these mountains . . . that’s a miracle (Connie Young, personal interview).

Two events provide illustrative and compelling examples of Dukes’ three categories of public conflict transformation. One was a public meeting facilitated by Lange which took place at the Applegate School on a Wednesday evening. The Partnership invited any interested community members to come for a discussion of three water-related issues—irrigation for farming, flood control (as managed at the Applegate Dam) and fishing and fish preservation. Federal and state agency officials (the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife) were asked to come and present information and answer questions. Close to two hundred community members attended; critical information was exchanged and by the end of the meeting, a new, local committee was formed to help with watershed monitoring and restoration projects.

The other was an all day retreat (and subsequent evening “potluck”) at Shipley’s house, overlooking the valley. It was attended by all Board members and their alternates, a number of Board member spouses, over a dozen USFS and BLM staffs and top managers and a score of community members at different times during the day. Part of the retreat was to identify specific objectives and develop an agenda for the following 60 days. Another aim was to identify past failures and challenges and opportunities that lay ahead. A third module was to identify successes of the past two years. Within this latter section, people listed items like “changed community dialogue between neighbors,” “more involvement with the agencies,” “changed the way the agencies do business,” “opportunity for community to come together,” “great response to [community] tree planting process,” “building relationships,” “great community response to the newsletter,” “cooperation between groups,” “education about issues and points of view,” “gap is closing between constituencies,” “brought private lands into process,” “growing acceptance of land stewardship concept” and “we’re still meeting.” Other more tangible successes were
listed, like the assessment projects.

Of course, none of the events of those two meetings erase the present difficulty with outcome goals (i.e., agreements, such as timber sales, implemented). The Partnership seems poised for improved outcomes, awaiting removal of some legal and agency barriers, but to date, their primary successes have been process-oriented and Watershed Council projects on private lands.

Critique

A different way to assess the Partnership can be provided by judging how well it meets the criticisms so often leveled at these kinds of alternative dispute resolution groups. In The Politics of Environmental Mediation, Douglas Amy presents the most thorough, wide-ranging and insightful critique of the potential problems inherent in any partnership or related process (cf. Folger & Bush, 1994, pp. 22-24, 72-75, 239-240). Amy's spectrum of potential problems include the following central issues: 1) unequal access to the negotiating table, meaning that certain groups are screened from representation or, on a lesser scale, unable to get information that other, wealthier groups can (cf. Shannon, 1991); 2) "cooptation," in which activists are distracted from morality-driven political organizing and litigating; 3) involuntary participation, which, for example, might be imposed by government agency; 4) unskilled or unprincipled mediators, who may prejudice or unduly affect the outcome; 5) unequal power of participants, with environmentalists usually on the short end; and finally, 6) losing sight of constituency or public interest, when reaching an agreement becomes an end in itself.

While each of these well-taken points represents a potential threat to the integrity of any partnership, they are generally absent or irrelevant to the Applegate group. The first issue, inequities in "access," is perhaps the most complicated. In most environmental collaborations, disputants chosen as representatives must go through an initial screening, some sort of assessment process. This is often conducted by mediators (see e.g., Carpenter & Kennedy, 1988), in order to "improve the likelihood that, once an informed decision to negotiate has been made, the parties will be successful in reaching an agreement" (Bingham, 1986, p. xxiii). While this is reasonable and necessary, given the possibility of unskilled or ill-prepared negotiators (let alone negotiation "saboteurs"), even self-selecting assessments (Wondolleck, 1988)--which is how the Partnership chose members--tend to eliminate immoderate voices from the table. For example, members of the radical environmental group Earth First!--whose motto is "No Compromise" and whose stated purpose is to refuse participation in "mainstream" environmental efforts (Lange, 1990)--would make unlikely representatives. Those against forest management of any kind--advocating "No Cut"--also fit this category. In cases such as these, in which immoderate activists refuse participation in the process, "unequal access" seems a spurious designation. The fact that
Partnership meetings are open to anyone who wishes to come, motivated by their basic principle of inclusiveness, further nullifies concerns about access. All that having been said, immoderate voices are at the Partnership table only on rare occasion. Perhaps the question of access can never be resolved to everyone's satisfaction.

The remainder of Amy's concerns are readily answered. The potential for cooptation is canceled by the fact that there are activists on all sides of the issue still moving forward with their political agendas in spite of the Partnership activity. (Even this small group of representatives seems to have avoided any cooptation; that is, Board members continue to pursue their own political goals outside of Partnership activity.) The third concern, involuntary participation, is irrelevant as is the fourth, unskilled or unprincipled mediators; participation is voluntary and there are no fulltime mediators. With regard to unequal power, we have shown above how power has shifted from one party to the other; it could easily shift back before the Partnership dissolves. And finally, there is the two part issue of public or constituency interests. It is our judgment that it would be difficult to find a group more committed to at least a strong local definition of the public interest. The focus on sustainable community is a simple but powerful testimony to this claim.

Of course, the question of constituent's interests is more complicated, but again, we think the Partnership meets the test. To be plain, we believe there will always be constituents dissatisfied with the outcomes of any Partnership activity. There are less moderate groups and individuals whose aims preclude any form of compromise (e.g., at least some members of Earth First! or the Wise Use movement). We do not judge their goals or tactics here but must point out that for better or worse, cooperation on environmental issues will almost always require some forms of compromise. Groups at the edges of the political spectrum, whose stated goals are to pull the center of the debate toward their end (see Lange, 1990; 1993), can not be expected to be enamored of mainstream "peacemaking" activities. As in any democratic forum, Partnership Board members can only attempt to represent the widest range and number of constituent interests, not every constituent's interests. We believe they do this as well as anyone could ask of them.

We now turn to various barriers that keep the Partnership from being more successful on a wider number of dimensions, including improved outcomes such as tangible actions and benefits.

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30 Finally, in the case of national forest management decisions, NEPA processes (National Environmental Protection Act) are open to all interested parties as well.
Structural Barriers to Success

As of this writing, the mill co-owned by a Partnership member temporarily shut down and is now back on line with one shift because of low prices and demand for lumber combined with heightened expense and limited supply of logs. A recent BLM timber sale elicited no bids, because high logging costs would have rendered the sale economically unfeasible in the current market. Other timber sales—some ecologically and aesthetically innovative, others "pulled off the shelf" to meet new quotas set by Washington, DC—are starting to come on line, but the local timber industry representatives are concerned that milling capacity and trained labor force in the Valley is being lost. These "salvage" sales—created by Congressional mandate—are problematic to Partnership success as they are seen by many of the public as compromising ecologically. This strains trust developed through relationships between Partnership members and agency personal, additionally, it creates problems for the Partnership as a whole as the community sees them as able to influence agency decision-making.

There are other forces larger than the Partnership which may limit success. A few Partnership Board members feel fatalistically that other, larger forces will undercut their efforts—believing, for example, that any timber sale project will be stalled by environmental organizations outside the region. While the Rogue Institute and the Forest Service work on local economic development issues such as local contracting, small-diameter log marketing and special forest products, structural change is controlled by extra-local forces and institutional barriers. Forest and watershed restoration and monitoring could employ a number of workers, perhaps more than conventional forest management (KenCairn, 1993), but funding is still problematic. There are few incentives or mandates for reinvestment in forest health and local economies. Agencies are having to search for outside funding for fire and density management projects.

While the Partnership's efforts at broadening representation on its Board and community outreach have been somewhat successful, property and income inequality in the region will limit its ability to "re-create community."

Inequality suppresses interaction among groupings of people whose lives and well-being are in fact tied together ecologically; and, without interaction, community—particularly a dynamic, interactional form of community—cannot exist" (Kenneth P. Wilkinson, quote in Brown, 1995). State land use policies and gentrification of the Valley threaten to force some old-timers off their land (Brown, 1995), increasing their hostility towards government and newcomers. Minorities are

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31On the other hand, as one Board member has put it, "We are not responsible for providing volume for the industry."
increasingly relied upon as cheap and reliable sources of labor in reforestation work, yet they are not integrated into the community or represented on the Partnership Board. Few people with inflexible working schedules are able or willing to attend Partnership meetings. In addition to the time commitment, there are risks involved:

Besides the coordination of childcare, transportation and time, these individuals are taking a different kind of risk: "[Lower income] people have had experiences where when they tried to make a change, they've been slammed. So they've learned. ... 'If I get too far out, I'm going to get cut off" (Brown, 1995, p. 279 interview with Rich Rhode).

Several blue collar workers involved in environmental issues in the 1980's lost their jobs as a result (Brown, 1995). While this does not appear to be a threat to Partnership members, there are fears of repercussions and a sense of economic vulnerability.

The Partnership has been successful at facilitating public involvement efforts for the local agencies; however, issues, within the local agencies and from their central offices, have affected the ability of agencies to contribute--as much as they did in the beginning--to the Partnership effort. More restrictive interpretations (as directed from the Washington Offices and Department of Justice) of FACA levied the greatest singular blow on local relationships. After agency members resigned from the board (at a tearful and angry meeting), Partnership members seemed to forget about their "no they" slogan and buttons. A petition was drawn up and circulated within the community declaring that the signers were "deeply troubled" that "the extreme fire hazards and risks to forest health posed by densely-overstocked stands, drought, insect and disease are not [emphasis theirs] being effectively addressed by the Forest Service and Bureau of Land management." The federal agencies were accused of being irresponsible and neglectful neighbors.

We can not be sure that FACA is totally responsible for the diminished agency participation at meetings, but it marked a new era of "agency bashing" and "acting out." These institutional issues have

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32Daneke (1987) points out that the failure of some ethnic and social groups to participate is because they choose not to split their focus by getting engaged on all issues. This is certainly arguable, but so is the point that they do not feel part of the local community and welcome to participate.

33Water issues and State agencies were similarly mentioned and indicted.

34Some members use the phrase "agency bashing" to refer to negative verbal behavior (e.g., denigration) directed at the agencies. While this is a common tactic for different activist groups, it had not been used by Partnership members prior to FACA. We use the phrase "acting out" to denote negative behavior (e.g., "whining," accusative letter writing) that seems designed to get agency attention or achieve agency movement on an issue. It has seemed to "work." More is said about both processes in the "Agency" section below.
definitely affected not only the Partnership's "outcome" effectiveness, but its processes.

In conclusion, we turn to Wondelleck and Yaffee's criteria for success (in FEMAT, 1993, p. VII-106-7). Their respondents reported that situations were successful when they:

-- led to tangible action or benefits
-- overcame bureaucracy
-- provided better stewardship of resources
-- generated administrative resources.
-- generated knowledge
-- built understanding
-- improved relationships
-- resolved short-term disputes; managed long-term conflict
-- provided for dynamic and flexible working arrangements.

The Partnership has successfully accomplished the last five, as we demonstrate throughout this report. We believe they are making substantial progress towards the first four, but constituents, government resource policy and agency structures make these accomplishments more problematic and time consuming. The Partnership is creating a foundation from which these "outcome successes" will be more easily realized in the future.
LESSONS

The following "lessons" are derived almost exclusively from the Applegate Partnership experience. They are intended for those interested in other ongoing or future partnership, AMA or related processes. Readers wanting an introductory or broader view should also consult a wider range of sources including Carpenter and Kennedy (1988), Wondolleck (1988), Lee (1993), Shannon and Robinson (1994), Wondolleck & Yaffee (1994) and other works cited throughout this report.

Here we concentrate on sixteen areas. With regard to planning, we take up a) vision and goals/objectives; b) selection of the "right" people, and c) how much to formalize a grass roots process. With regard to group dynamics and related "process" issues, we address d) trust, e) constituencies, f) intractable issues, g) power, h) conflict i) FACA, j) phases and k) media. We then discuss lessons from the organizational and community context including l) shifting organizational philosophies m) time and patience n) diversity o) networks p) community resources and q) attachment to place. Additional "lessons" directed toward the agencies in particular may be found in the "Agency" section.

Planning

Vision and goal/objectives

Developing the vision and goals and objectives was one of the most important processes in which the Partnership engaged. By focusing on their interests and not their positions (the classic conflict management formulation by Fisher & Ury, 1981), the group was able to find common ground and articulate their common intentions. These tools--the vision and goals--gave them a clear, articulated, shared purpose and direction to which they could return when "lost" or (sometimes anyway) in disagreement. We can not overestimate the significance and usefulness of these "devices." It seems that generating such a vision and goals would be useful for any Partnership group.

Selection of the "right" people

Perhaps it will be less easy for future groups to re-create the excellence in personnel from both the public and the agencies the Partnership enjoys. First, many of the members have outstanding skills and talents, which collectively cross an extraordinarily wide range--from writing and administering grants to productively managing group conflicts. They are similarly fortunate to have the help from the NGOs to which Board members belong. Second, Partnership Board members have displayed a strong level of commitment, continuing to press on through many difficult times when it would have been so much easier to withdraw. Their connection to place, community and group, their different personal stakes, their view
of themselves as "distinctive" and "special," all have helped sustain them through several crises. Third, they have invested (Kanter, 1972) an almost overwhelming amount of time, sometimes engaged in repetitive or even tedious tasks. Their collective work ethic and participation expectations are exceptional, and would perhaps be intimidating to others.

Maybe one simple and obvious lesson lurking here is that groups must take advantage of all the resources at their disposal. Our limited but not insubstantial knowledge of other partnership groups reminds us that there are many exceptional, committed people with estimable contributions to make who are working on these issues. Future partnership groups won't duplicate the excellence on the Applegate; they will generate their own.

"Formalizing" a grass roots process

We have discussed how the Partnership was a grass roots effort, while hinting how more "formalization" of the process may have been useful. Here we will discuss three ways. First, a mediator, chosen and sanctioned by the Partnership Board from the start, might have been able to provide more guidance and valuable organization to the overall process. With Partnership permission, such a person might have taken the group through a more formalized, sequential and presumably more efficient scheme, such as those offered by theorist/practitioners like Bingham (1987), Carpenter & Kennedy (1988), Gray (1989), Daniels et al. (1994) or Wondolleck (1988). This may have saved time, reduced unproductive conflict and clarified certain points of confusion. A sanctioned mediator might have better managed activities between meetings, provided a clearer picture of available paths, even headed off occasions of constituency resistance.

Three examples will illustrate the point. First is the Partnership's current approach to decision-making. It is essentially a "weak consensus" process with two exceptions: the agencies retain final decision authority within their domain (e.g., timber sales) and the Partnership votes but only when consensus appears impossible. Yet there is little common understanding and/or training about what consensus is, how to go about achieving it on issues of controversy, the "costs" of voting, etc. When one of the facilitators offered to provide a brief training in consensus—as the Partnership was running into more frequent roadblocks—the suggestion was met with little enthusiasm, and soon faded. Had a sanctioned mediator "forced" such a training, as a necessary part of the process, the current confusion may have been alleviated. A second example is media relations. As earlier indicated, the Partnership ran into some unexpected difficulties with the news media. An experienced mediator, there from the start, may have helped head off these issues, perhaps by helping develop a media strategy for when problems arose, e.g., "present all information in a positive light," etc. (For additional strategies, see Carpenter & Kennedy, pp.
Finally, there were decisions that the Partnership had to muddle through as they came up. These included who could speak for the Partnership, what they could say, who could sign written documents on behalf of the Partnership, etc. A mediator might have helped prepare the Board early for such likely occurrences.

Second, we believe that training in conflict management would have been useful (e.g., Daniels, et al, 1994; Wondolleck, 1988b). Such training would have fostered a climate of "intentionality" and "reflexivity" that, to some extent, is still generally missing from the group. By this we mean that some group members don't always fully understand the potential effects of their words; they might not consider the larger group beyond their own situation. Few members have an informed picture of group process and group dynamics. Fewer still understand the inevitability of conflict, its types, character and shape, and how to productively respond. We have discussed conflict elsewhere; it is sufficient now to quote one Board member:

If in fact you transported this [process] to another group, if the group was genuinely interested in doing something like this, you would want to have early training in conflict resolution. There is no question in my mind that they would [become successful] faster and more effectively than we did.

The third and final more formal element that would have been helpful is agency staff. According to one agency member, "We needed staff. We needed staff to take minutes, staff to track stuff, staff to type things, staff to mail things."

There is, however, one important qualifier to add to these comments. While it may have been helpful in a number of ways--if indeed the Partnership "formalized" the process with mediation, group training and agency staff--some of the grass roots spirit and team feeling that developed as the group worked together might have been compromised. Their teamwork was sometimes deft, sometimes clumsy, but always together with a strong shared commitment to the process. They sank or swam together. When Su Rolle discussed this grass roots-formalization dilemma in an interview, she mused that any formal mediation or conflict resolution training would have to come from someone from within the group. Any outside expert, who didn't share the vision would be resisted. To come in and "overlay" a previously conceived model would not have fit:

People might not have had patience for [outside training]. . . If in fact it would have been possible, it would have been great. . .[But] for the trust to be there, that person [would have] to be fully embraced by the whole team, as part of the team . . . [We would all need to feel that] we're on the same team [author's italics to reflect emphasis in voice].
When the interviewer pointed out how highly unusual that would be, Su reminded us that "Everything here is unusual. Our structures aren’t yet in place for the things that are needed." Perhaps at the next initial deck meeting of a newly evolving partnership, a mediator/trainer might be asked to join.

**Group Dynamics and Related "Process" Issues**

**Trust**

About the concept and practice of trust, we can say little more than we have already described: its critical role in the process; its underlying characteristics and limitations; how tenuous it can be, especially between previous adversaries; and how the Partnership found that among other methods, "just spending time together," while "being real" and "authentic" with one another proved to be one of the most important avenues to building trust. We believe that one attribute of partnerships that will continually challenge the delicate state of trust is the set of "battles" that continue between members' constituencies. That is, as constituents—especially friends and supporters—continue their political and information campaigns, it is especially difficult to trust another board member who originally came from "the other side."

**Constituencies**

The Applegate Partnership’s experience with constituents—local, regional and national—illustrates an entire set of thorny issues with which collaborating groups must wrestle. The sheer complexity of constituent relationships—especially in partnerships involving national lands wherein anyone could conceivably claim constituent status—expands, intensifies and complicates any participating member’s responsibilities.

In 1994, Stankey posed the following question:

Given the powerful role of special interests, how can collaborative decision-making structures, designed to achieve social learning and a consensus of views, avoid the perception of cooptation by the 'parent' groups whose individual members participate (p. 6)?

At this point in time, the Partnership provides little clear direction. Based on our limited experience, we can not envision creating any collaborative structure that would satisfy all constituents' and constituent groups' desires. Partnerships are not exclusively win-win processes in which everyone gets what they want; they involve compromise in which the different sides make concessions in order to achieve different gains or avoid other (worse) losses. Thus, whenever a partnership does engage in compromise, it will invite the accusation of being "coopted" by their less moderate constituents. And even if those constituents could eventually be satisfied, other constituents would most certainly appear to take their place on the
extreme end of the political spectrum (see Lange, 1990). Unfortunately, we predict accusations of "cooptation" in future partnerships. Perhaps one of the lessons here is for agencies or others to be careful about counting on any partnership representative, constituent or group. It is too easy to be victimized by a "bait and switch" negotiating strategy, whether that strategy was intentional or otherwise. There are some within the agency who felt they were victimized in just that way on the Partnership One sale, thinking they had the environmental community's backing when the Partnership "approved" the sale. When environmental constituent groups sued, they felt foolish and angry.

Ironically, constituency dissatisfaction in many ways strengthened the Applegate Partnership. After a while, the continued expression of dissatisfaction created a common enemy on which Board members could focus their frustrations. As alliances shifted, charges of the Partnership's "coercive harmony" were added to accusations of "cooptation," but again, this only solidified the group's cohesiveness and determination. Board members were especially angry at the constituents who refused to come to the table, but instead, insisted on staying "on the outside," taking "pot shots" at whatever plans or outcomes did not suit them, in effect exacerbating not reducing conflict. For those constituents, it was obviously an easier and relatively cost-free way to maintain power and influence within the Partnership and without.

"Intractable" Issues

A related concern involves the "degree of difficulty" of the issues that any partnership is willing to address. In traditional negotiations, the most difficult and contentious issues are saved for last, in order to first establish a track record of success. Daniels et al. (1994) go so far as to recommend that collaborative groups avoid the most contentious issues, arguing that they take a disproportionate amount of time and increase the likelihood of failure. This is a useful strategy, but only up to a point.

The Partnership, for example, made the decision not to get involved in the previously USFS-approved "Sugarloaf" timber sale. The group turned down some environmental constituents' request that the Partnership register an "official protest" of the nearby sale, because, according to these constituents, it violated ecosystem management principles. The Partnership decided that the sale was "too religious;"
that is, some people had a spiritual attachment to the mountain. Therefore, a rational discussion with other representatives and constituents—who also viewed Sugarloaf as critical—would be unlikely. The group foresaw instead being mired in a non-functional debate.

We judge this unwillingness to get involved with Sugarloaf as a wise decision overall. It was a sign of Partnership maturity to know its "limits." However, the refusal did move some local and regional environmental constituents to "write off" the Partnership. The decision also demonstrates that just as there will always be immoderate and dissatisfied constituents, there will always be difficult and intractable issues.

Thus, one of the tests for any Partnership group is where it draws the line on "intractability." While staying away from overly "religious" issues seems useful, the wider that range gets defined, the less useful the Partnership becomes. It is conceivable that a partnership, in an attempt to avoid difficulty, would so expand the range of what is considered intractable, that they would cease to be of much use. If a group only took on easy issues, their effectiveness would be marginal at best. This will be an issue for future groups who, like the Partnership, begin without a specific, predetermined set of issues to negotiate.

Power

As noted earlier, within the space of just a few years, the power position shifted twice. Prior to the mid-1980's, the timber industry had to make few major environmental concessions. Once the spotted owl listing occurred, of course, environmentalists held the high power position. Following the 1994 Congressional elections, when industry-supporting Republicans dominated, the power shifted back (at least somewhat) toward the industry.

The implicit lesson here is about the longterm viability of partnerships. It might make sense to resist partnerships if one's group were guaranteed a stable high power position. However, the zero-sum nature of these disputes and the swing of the "political pendulum" precludes certainty of any coalition's ascendancy (Kemmis, 1990; Thurow, 1980). The Applegate provides a perfect illustration. At the beginning, prior to the elections, some environmentalist constituents argued against participation in partnerships, believing that promoting enforcement of environmental law (e.g., the Endangered Species Act and others) was the best way to meet their goals. Some cynics claimed that the industry would not have come to the table were it not for the spotted owl listing. After the elections, there were was some softening in environmentalist constituents' stance and threats from industry that they would leave the table. Given the two power shifts, and the likelihood of others in the future, it should be apparent that it was (and will be) in the best interests of both groups to remain at the bargaining table, since mutual collaboration will achieve more joint gain than individual competitive strategies which would, over time, cancel each
other out (Axelrod, 1984).

Conflict

Still, the very nature of partnerships invites conflict. Given such inevitability, the first point is that it would be a grave mistake to studiously avoid all disputes. Such evasion usually results in lingering doubt, reduced trust, and/or mounting anger that eventually explodes; "smoothing over" is occasionally useful but more often leads to problems coming back to haunt the group in a different form. Instead, conflict, if "waged" productively, can be used for learning, providing yet another mechanism to recognize errors (Lee, 1993) so as to improve the partnership process. Members of the Applegate Partnership either knew this going in, or learned it the hard way (as for example when communication difficulties finally moved them to hammer out ground rules of productive communication).

Earlier we offered recommendations that future groups consider using a mediator, and that they engage in conflict management training. We would also recommend, more specifically, that groups develop their own ground rules for productive communication (with the help of a facilitator or mediator who is experienced in conflict resolution practice). Further, these ground rules should be periodically revisited, with the group engaging in self-reflection as to how well it has measured up. Ground rules should be modified as needed and sanctions or consequences for "breaking them" made clear and—if necessary—applied.

There is a one more general conflict lesson to offer here. While the Applegate Partnership Board members were generally willing to acknowledge that group dynamics was an important issue, and while they did do some periodic self-assessment along those lines, there was still some resistance by those less comfortable or facile with group process issues. In other words, it may have been useful to pay more attention to group dynamics. We know it isn’t always true that more communication and self-reflection is always better, yet the Partnership’s history of deep differences and enmity, when combined with the conflicts they still experience, suggests that they might have usefully spent more time examining group process issues. We suspect that future groups will face similar dilemmas: how to overcome internal resistance to this kind of work, even in the face of evidence that it may be useful, even necessary.

FACA

Opinions vary on how FACA has affected the Partnership. Certainly, it resulted in resignation from the Board of four key agency representatives and that is considered a loss by all. Possibly, some agency members would have eventually resigned, anyway.

Some think that FACA has been used as an excuse for agency members to reduce their involvement in the Partnership. Others, particularly regional environmental groups, feel that FACA
should keep the Partnership, along with other special interest groups, out of agency "smoke-filled back rooms." A response is that the Partnership is not a narrow interest group which holds closed meetings. People are encouraged to attend, meetings are posted, and groups (most notably environmentalists) do show up when they feel their interests may be compromised. While some feel that not having agency representatives (particularly area managers and district rangers, i.e., line officers) "at the table" renders the Partnership less potent, others think that it has turned the focus of the Partnership to its true constituency, the community. While the Partnership can no longer advise on federal agency issues, it has designated power in being a Watershed Council. In any event, the interagency liaison has exhausted tremendous energy and time seeking counsel and clear interpretation of the law. It has also left hard feelings among Partnership members who feel deserted by the agencies and cast once again as "outsiders." There is a perceived shift by many that agency partners are no longer "true" partners with a corresponding air of formality that goes against the spirit of genuine relationships.

Media

While the group had a media strategy, their best intentions were thwarted when events emerged for which they did not plan. It might have helped to develop more specific ground rules about discussions with the news media—including one that addressed potential membership changes and one that specified periodic revisitation of the media-related ground rules (see e.g., Carpenter & Kennedy, 1988, p. 124).

Shifting organizational philosophies: A pendulum swing

The Applegate Partnership is only one example of many groups and organizations that have, for the last decade, found themselves shifting from a traditional, autocratic, hierarchical organizing pattern to a relatively new, more democratic, flatter organizing structure. The majority of organizations across the country—including the Fortune 500, small businesses, various federal and non-federal governmental agencies—are wrestling with institutionalizing processes like participative decision-making, employee involvement and empowerment, self-directed work teams and other, collaboration-oriented operations. The current increase in partnerships specifically, and the human dimensions of ecosystem management more generally, are not unrelated to this general societal trend (see esp. Stankey, 1994).

Many of the partnership "problems" arise from issues inherent in these new forms, e.g., heightened expectations regarding one's input; a wider range of constituents (with a wider range of needs) who also want input; the increased importance of trust and relational harmony; the increased ambiguity surrounding general direction, decision-making authority and constraints or limits; the additional time required for problem-solving; the diffusion of accountability and responsibility; the required adjustment for those previously in positions of (more autocratically-based) power; and the internal politics of teams, as
when teamwork can be stalled or worse, sabotaged, by participants or constituents who don't like the way things are going.

These problems haunt most groups and organizations experimenting with new, collaborative forms; in no way do they exhaust the potential list. While it seems unlikely that organizations will soon do an about face, and completely retreat to the clarity associated with the earlier, more autocratic organization models, we believe that the above list of problems may indicate the edge of a pendulum swing. That is, all organizations attempting to innovate, including the federal agencies, must now seek new ways to incorporate some of the benefits of collaboration—e.g., the enhanced cooperation and commitment, the enhanced sensitivity to real issues, the increase in human resources and "on board" person power, the advantages of teams and teamwork, the empowerment of individuals—without incurring all the adversity and afflictions that collaboration seems to spawn. So there may be a partial retreat, as organizational leaders struggle to find the appropriate place for them on the autocratic-collaborative continuum, and the pendulum naturally begins to swing back along its arc.

**Time and Patience**

"Instead of presuming that optimal institutional solutions can be designed easily and imposed at low cost by external authorities . . . 'getting the institutions right' is a difficult, time-consuming, conflict evoking process . . ." (Ostrum, 1990 p. 14, in Shannon and Robinson, 1994).

It's been almost three years since the initial "deck party." While things seemed to fall in place fairly quickly at the beginning (e.g., the "vision statement"), gaining community acceptance, completing multiple assessments (ecological, hydrologic, social and economic), and getting timber sales through roadblocks have been complex, ongoing processes. Even the first projects involved a core group of people from the agencies and community working innumerable hours, meeting twice a week or more at the beginning to craft papers and projects.

The partnership process can be like therapy (Wengert, 1976). It is a reflective, self-conscious process (Sancar, 1994) in which a diverse group of people are learning about themselves, their community and their landscape. The long and sometimes tedious process can be justified as providing a basis for better decisions, but science and planning with so many players simply takes time. Exploring new ideas and testing and monitoring them takes time. Fortunately, the process itself can be rewarding; the satisfaction of resolving conflict and achieving or enabling local control keeps people at the table.

Partnerships depend on broad participation in order to effectively and equitably represent all parties. Yet the time commitment limits the number of people and organizations that can participate. Therefore, in order to be truly representative, partnerships need to develop multiple methods of
involvement and decision making: frequent and varied forums for public discussion, constant outreach and communication efforts, and open and provisional decision-making.

Community Context

Diversity

Just as diversity is critical to ecosystem health, it is important to community, group and organizational wellbeing and effectiveness. Just as diverse forests can better withstand drought or infestation, diverse groups can better absorb conflict and disension. Diversity avoids concentration of power. Although nearly 30% of private land in the Applegate is owned by timber companies, the diversity of the local industry prevents any one owner from dominating.

Most rural resource-dependent communities don't provide the ready diversity available in the Applegate. Community and partnership leaders will need to seek and cultivate diverse participation. They will need to embrace the newcomers' energy and resources, but not neglect the others. Leaders may need to push beyond the comfort zone in the quest for inclusion. It is too easy to forget those people who do not have traditional access to the process; the status quo is unsuitable representation (KenCairn, 1995).

Of course diverse representation and interests will create other challenges. The Applegate Partnership worked outside of the traditional political structure (although at least one sympathetic county commissioner was kept informed). Other groups might find politicians who want to be involved and who can act as an important resource, although often politicians' motivations and interests are likely to be different than those of other partnership members.

When the Partnership broadened its agenda from ecosystem to community issues it attenuated the interest of those with more focused timber interests. While working on a diversity of issues draws a wider range of parties, it can also diffuse the energies of the group.

Networks

Strong partnerships will rely on broad networks, connected individuals, organizations and communities who are able to share ideas, information and resources. The birth of the Applegate Partnership began with the connection of Jack Shipley and Jim Neal, representing their respective networks of local watershed environmental groups, innovative timber harvesting organizations and federal agency advocates. The first deck party drew from these networks. Networking with non-profit organizations within the local region (as well as with their respective networks) provided important leadership and resources valuable for "jump-starting" and maintaining the Partnership. Networking with other partnerships and similar community-based initiatives provided opportunities for sharing stories, strategies, frustrations and hopes. Informal local structures and networks are the means by which most
Community members communicate and respond to issues, and responsive partnerships are able to recognize and draw on these. Communities with ties to economic and political centers within their regions are able to diversify and respond more proactively to social transition and policy change. "Finally, dense networks of interaction probably broaden the participants' sense of self, developing the "I" into the "we" .... " (Putnam, 1995).

**Community Resources**

Just as few partnerships will be able to draw on the extraordinary personal resources available to the Applegate Partnership, few rural communities will contain the complex of resources of the Applegate Valley. Obviously, each partnership will reflect the strengths and goals of its communities. While the early flavor of the Applegate Partnership was greatly affected by "midtimers" and leaders from outside the community, other groups may be ably led by oldtimers seeking to restore the community they once knew. Other early visionaries might be agency personnel. Some partnerships will start with a focus on community well-being and only much later move into ecosystem issues. Some might begin with a concern focused on saving a particular place. Over time, the Applegate Partnership evolved and shifted, in composition and direction. Others will, also. The point is to start where the resources and strengths are and to build on these. The partnership process, will, by necessity build community capacity and mobilize resources.

**Attachment to Place**

Community members with diverse interests and affiliations can be collectively mobilized by an appeal to their attachment to place. Getting people on the ground (e.g., field trips) can clarify values and possibly reduce the divisive rhetoric. People have opportunities to find they have common interests and values. This, in fact, is what happened often in the Applegate. In rural areas, without central or even distinct towns, what is often distinctive about communities is place, itself. It may be the strongest dimension that draws people together, particularly as neighborhoods are undergoing social and demographic transitions associated with the sense of loss of community.

**Phases**

Partnerships have their own "life course"; they progress through a series of stages. Viewing the progression of the Applegate Partnership over time has revealed patterns which may help predict issues and define changes for other partnerships (cf. Cooley and Heikkila, 1994 for a description of watershed council phases and Moore, 1994 for advisory council phases). The following discussion draws from literature on social movements and observations of a number of partnership groups. (A more complete discussion is available in Sturtevant, 1994).
During the first stage, the potential for the partnership is discovered, a "prophet" provides vision and a core group is established of members sharing frustration with the status quo and hope for change. Resources are mostly personal at this point, and the primary support of the affiliated organizations and community is to suspend judgment. During the first stage the group works on seeking an identity and common goals, while studiously avoiding old stereotypes and splintering issues.

The second stage is a period of articulation and organization. Leaders from other government and non-government organizations are recruited and local resources (media, funding, expertise) are mobilized. Membership criteria and potential become defined, members' dedication is fueled by the sense that they belong to a "circle of the select" committed to shared collective goals and desires for reform. Process leadership is useful at this point to manage group dynamics. The organization becomes formalized with a board, a vision document and incorporation. This is the period during which the organization "comes out" and manages the response of constituencies and the community. Although there is sympathetic support from many, others are skeptical or aroused in response to a perceived threat. The Applegate Partnership moved into the second stage fairly quickly, although it did not "come out" for many months.

The third stage may be skipped or never reached by some partnerships, while it may be significant and lengthy for others. The Applegate has been in this stage for over a year. This is a period of application, specification and defense of principles. During this difficult stage the group is usually thrust into the political process, yet still needs to mobilize new, and maintain old, economic and organizational resources. Leadership and core members are beginning to feel their sacrifices, and ridicule and ostracism from other groups may be at their height. Some concessions may need to be made and leaders holding to original convictions may be considered by members and supporters as too fanatical or purist. (The Applegate leadership has come close to this point, but the process has tempered it.) Experienced and trained leadership becomes increasingly important, and new leadership is developed through the group process. Leaders and core members spend much of the time "on the road" networking, seeking support and legitimation. The organization may suffer during the absence of these key players, as was the case during early periods in the Applegate before a broad base of leadership was developed.

While we haven't seen the completion of this stage in the Partnership, studies of social movements would make us expect that membership will continue to grow as the organization gains momentum and attention. Factions among members may build, simply by virtue of size and divisions in purpose. Some members will become exhausted or disenchanted, others will leave for membership in other organizations, but some will need to be sustained for continuity. Resources during this stage depend on links to the external environment--specialists, government officials, media, non-profit organizations and allies.
Process must include some outcome; concrete results must be seen by members, supporters and skeptics. Indulgence will be suspended, government and other organizations are on notice, some eager to join or manage the group.

The last stage is where the partnership becomes institutionalized and routinized into society. This may be what environmental groups predict as "cooptation," although it need not be bad for the ultimate goals of ecosystem health and community empowerment, nor for the agency or group which "coopts" it. The partnership and its objectives will have been adopted by most constituents and organizations. The original membership is no longer the vanguard and becomes diffused, or focused on particular tasks. Resources are mostly drawn from formal organizations, the sources institutionalized and regular. Action becomes ongoing and routine; goals are diffused as the conflict with greater society is absorbed. This is often a period of fragmentation and demise for social change movements, many times a result of their success.
NOTES TO THE AGENCIES

"I can never really go back. I can't go back to seeing neighbors and community in the same way. I can't go back and see the agencies that are across the boundaries from us as somebody separate that we shouldn't work with in a totally different way. I can't go back to thinking of decision-making as 'because I'm the ranger I'm in charge.' I feel like they'll always be the sense now that to have this be the best decision is really to share that decision making at a larger level and a wider spectrum. . . . I've significantly changed" (Su Rolle, Applegate videotape, 1993).

"I hope that there's always a need for something like the Partnership, whether it's this one or another one because it really does force people to sit down and work together face to face. It brings that human element in and I hope we don't ever get away from that" (John Lloyd, Applegate videotape, 1993).

While the scope of this project does not include full-scale analysis of implications for agency administration, we will mention briefly our observations of opportunities for innovation as well as potential barriers to success. We will employ local voices and examples to illustrate our conclusions. This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive; interested readers can refer to a forthcoming case study of the Partnership by Craig Shinn (Lewis and Clark College).

Opportunities

Education, Outreach and Conflict Resolution

The Partnership provides a neutral forum for community members and the general public to express their concerns, share their knowledge and declare their hopes for the land to which they feel connected. A group of people with a wide variety of interests and stakes in the valley has developed ongoing relationships with one another and public agency personnel. Other individuals know they can bring problems to the Partnership (e.g., slides of "butcher job" of a NIPF (private forest land) by a local logger, or frustrations with a headgate improperly designed by a government contracted engineer) and expect problem solving suggestions and actions. Still others--for example, some members of the Williams community who feel passionately, and most radically, about the forest to which they are connected--know that they can occasionally come to meetings to express concerns about Partnership activities (such as the "Applegate Proposal") or agency decisions (such as the Sugarloaf timber sale). Finally, agency personnel
can turn to the Partnership for help in publicizing informational gatherings and encouraging key people to attend.\footnote{A Partnership Board member has taken the recently hired Community Development Specialist (USFS) under her wing, toting her to peoples' homes, potlucks and other gatherings.}

In sponsored meetings where the public is invited to meet with agencies over specific issues, the Partnership is able to set a tone of moderation, mutual responsibility and information sharing. People feel safe in expressing their views. As one Applegate resident said, "Now you can go out and not wear a bullet proof vest if you're talking about the environment." Potlucks, field trips and tree planting sessions provide safe and constructive opportunities for agencies to interact, building relationships and public trust.

The Partnership experience demonstrates that, if given the opportunity, citizens can educate one another rather than depend on the agencies to play the role of neutral arbiter. One Partnership Board member (an environmentalist) spoke of her Watershed Council outreach interviews with local residents: "The opportunity of interviewing people opened up a whole new world for me--insight and understanding of sides I never took the time to listen to before." Another (a farmer) said: "I talked to a lot of rednecks, also environmentalists. I learned from them and hope I taught them something, as well."

Citizens, in Partnership settings, can also learn to manage much of their own conflict and moderate their views.

"We're going to have to come to some kind of agreement where we can all co-exist and where we can protect our natural resources and take care of God's world. The miracle is that these people will sit down and listen to each other . . . they don't just shout at one another . . . I have to give a little just like I see Chris Bratt giving a little . . . his perspective on the watershed is totally different than mine" (Connie Young, personal interview, 1995).

Community outreach can educate new residents unfamiliar with long established customs such as open grazing and riverfront access. Residents also can benefit from education concerning habitat and riparian protection and fire prevention. The Partnership is preparing a brochure for newcomers and has adopted a "welcome wagon" role. Community members doing outreach for the Applegate Watershed Council shared these observations at a recent meeting:

We get complaints from newcomers about bells on cattle . . .
We want to tell them to expect smells and sounds of farming.
Newcomers don't trust people, we want to teach them to relax a little bit, it's not necessary to line property with no trespassing zones.
Building Community Support, Relationships and Credibility

Of course, Partnership activities increase awareness and understanding of natural resource issues for more than just newcomers. Through ongoing involvement and in depth discussions and field trips, participants not only increase their understanding of the tradeoffs and issues faced by management, but develop a stake in project success and will serve as an advocate. A caveat here is community partners can't fend off all adversarial responses, as the Forest Service discovered with the appeal of Partnership One and the necessity of still having to write an airtight Environmental Assessment.

Sitting at a partnership table with various publics on an ongoing basis in an atmosphere of trust and openness allows agency personnel to present a human side. They are allowed to admit that they don't have all the answers, that their directives and legal mandates are unclear and sometimes contradictory, and that they sometimes feel tied up by administrative regulations. Agency personnel can express their personal concerns, show they care about the human consequences of resource planning decisions, and share their deeply held values concerning the environment. They are allowed to move from the position of defensiveness and let down their guard. This is not only a relief to agency members, but it enhances their credibility with the public and facilitates meaningful discourse and social learning.

Rather than burying their deeply held beliefs and values, agency members can work with the public to discover commonly held underlying and basic values and arrive at decisions that reflect their common concerns. The public has been aware of agency values (Henning, 1987). They can see them in planning decisions, actions and reports; yet they don't know the personal and organizational tradeoffs required and a public only allowed to surmise agency reasoning misses important texture and dynamics. Discussions at Partnership meetings reveal many of the difficult parameters of decision-making.

As trusted relationships are built, agency members discover they can reach a broader range of their publics. As relationships with partners become more durable, the circle of meaningful public contacts can expand, not only because contacts become less stressful, but because partners will do much of the outreach work. Agency members' voices best articulate the changes they've experienced. One manager said, "I've learned a great deal from the people around this table about what happens in these communities." Another articulated the impact of partnership involvement this way:

I think that having a real basis of community also does something else. It is much more than the intellectual creative innovation stuff . . . [we talk about as] happening to the people in the agencies who are involved in the community. It begins to create meaning in our work . . . deeper meaning. By interacting with the people we serve we can see that what we're doing on the ground really does make a difference and God knows every person needs that in their work. Am I
making a difference? Am I serving the planet or the community in some way for the long term? That has given a huge charge to a number of people in the agencies, both BLM and the FS, who have had an opportunity to genuinely participate. And for people who haven't participated, it's different, they just don't get it. . . . those who have really participated have had a shift inside that's happened (Su Rolle, personal interview, 1995).

**Adaptive Management**

In adaptive management the scope of science and public participation is expanded from traditional models to a "more elaborate and productive interplay" between ecologists, decision-makers and participating public; there is "much to learn from one another" (Walters and Holling, 1990, p. 2063). Public participation provides the surprises and diversity which must be embraced. Greater societal participation can lead to a wider array of treatments for scientific analysis; results of management on private land offer valuable historical information. For example, when agency foresters spoke of their lack of knowledge about the capacity of release (tree growth) after thinning of dense stands, a Partnership participant suggested that they examine his stands which have been thinned for twenty years.

Adaptive management is defined as a continuing process of action based planning, monitoring, evaluation and adjustment (FEMAT, 1993). Partnership members are eager to help with monitoring impacts of management and are willing to commit to the training necessary to do it credibly. They recognize the importance of monitoring, not only designing and adjusting management regimes, but also in building public trust by providing objective, credible and accessible evaluation.

Small groups of people representing diverse interest groups can collaborate to design management projects which can be used as iterative learning experiments. For example, two agency representatives (including the district ranger), two environmentalists and some cattlemen recently met to discuss concerns about effects of grazing on a sensitive riparian area in the Applegate. The cattlemen listened to environmentalists' concerns about the water pollution, environmentalists listened to the suggestion that cattle be used as a fire management tool. The cattlemen were positive about looking at issues and a cooperative effort to fence cattle from delicate riparian areas was forged. A pilot program was proposed to run twenty cattle in Carberry Creek which hasn’t been grazed for ten years (when 80-100 previously ran). Partnership members would contribute to the monitoring efforts of this "managing to learn" project which would otherwise have difficulty gaining public approval.38

38Further discussion of this project follows in the "Legal Obstacles" section. While the Partnership public are willing to conditionally support renewed grazing in this ecologically sensitive area, agency specialists have raised concerns.
Community Identity and Growth

Rural communities across the country have seen their rural identity and autonomy eroded by decades of social change (Vidich and Bensman, 1958; Fitchen, 1991). The social landscape of rural communities has been altered as drastically as the ecological landscape. Land management agencies are reproached by some as being absentee land owners, yet private corporations and urban individuals—often more invisible and untouchable—make decisions about their rural lands with significant impacts on the quality of life in these communities. Local issues revolving around restricted access to public lands are exacerbated by newly fenced private lands and increased population pressure created by farms divided into multiple residences. Local issues concerning restricted logging on public lands are compounded by land management practices on private industrial lands.

Rural communities are undergoing difficult transitions as society becomes more diverse, urbanized, technically oriented, environmentally conscious (Daniels et al., 1994) and economically polarized. Public servants become easy targets for frustration; they are held responsible for decisions beyond their control. The public feels threatened by agency decisions: wilderness or habitat protection is viewed as threatening economic livelihood and private property rights—yet another government intervention; timber sales are seen as degrading pristine forests and threatening sacred places. Agencies often unwittingly enhance the conflict between these groups in their mandated public involvement efforts; sometimes they alienate potential allies.

Partnerships can provide a forum for varying publics to share their frustrations and fears, temper others and unite in responding to regain control over their communities. Rural publics have a personal stake in decisions over significant portions of their landscapes. They are willing to come together as "communities of place" rather than "communities of interest." Agencies should capitalize on their willingness and serve as a catalyst to the progress, rather than splitting communities back into constituencies, as was done, for example, in the formation of Provincial Advisory Committees.

Interagency Coordination

The joining of agencies in managing resources in the Applegate provides the opportunity to share resources and expertise, explore and resolve conflicting philosophies and goals, better examine cumulative effects and respond creatively to community concerns. Although some might argue that there was more interagency cooperation with the Partnership before the FACA interpretation forced agency members from the Board, Su Rolle’s job continues as the interagency coordinator, working with the appropriate line officers from BLM and USFS in the Applegate Adaptive Management Area. Much of the interagency coordination now takes place at the management level, rather than between individuals joined at the
Applegate Partnership table.

By managing across public land boundaries the Partnership can encourage by example—and provide the technical expertise to support—other kinds of cross-boundary cooperation. An important first step to this kind of management is the sharing of information, which was done locally with a recent GIS (Geographical Information System) merger. While each of the agencies had data for their lands on their own GIS overlays, there were large holes of missing data for other ownerships. This is an important tool for cooperating with industrial land managers, as well as small woodlot owners.

Barriers

Difficulties of Interagency Coordination

With two National Forests, three ranger districts, two BLM district area managers—all with different management directives, organizational cultures and personal approaches to land management and public interaction—interagency coordination on the Applegate AMA is a challenge. In addition to the federal agencies, State Departments of Forestry in California and Oregon, Natural Resource Conservation Districts and various County agencies have jurisdiction over natural resources in the area. Fragmentation of authority and overlapping agency authorities can result in cooperation or mutual obstruction (Cortner et al., 1994). While sometimes coordination is blocked by agencies' conflicting regulations or goals, often agencies simply fail to recognize or commit resources to a common problem.

Applegate Partnership members share their difficulties with and frustrations at being sent to one office after another, each with a different slant on an issue. Members complain about turf protection by some agency managers and conflicting styles of management. Meetings are difficult when rotating agency representatives contradict one another or can’t answer questions which fall in another person’s jurisdiction. Much of the frustration is attributable to the bureaucratic nature of regulatory and planning agencies; additionally, some personnel are involved in fundamental organizational shifts and all are experiencing reductions in staff and budgets. As interagency cooperation becomes more commonplace, hopefully, the rewards will become more apparent, incentives to participate will become institutionalized, and working with the public will be more satisfying.

Conflict Management

Many of the people at the Applegate Partnership table were once adversaries and old tensions and defensive postures sometimes sneak back. In the Partnership atmosphere these "ghosts" usually disappear

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There is value, however, in having agency specialists visit Partnership meetings. Their presentations are often educational and entertaining, and build rapport with the Partnership, which earns greater respect and credibility for agency representatives in discussions of potentially sensitive topics.
as quickly as they arise; one need not make too much of them. As we have mentioned repeatedly, conflict is inevitable in this process, particularly with outside constituents, and increasingly with agencies (since the time of the FACA ruling). Bureaucracies, being based on rationality and expertise, are expected to make decisions in a routine and orderly manner (Gerth and Mills, 1946). As put by Kai Lee,

... public politics implemented by bureaucracies implicitly assume the absence of conflict; the presumption is part of the reason bureaucracies are readily stymied by disputes. Public servants are taught to serve the public, and they are puzzled when voices, each plausibly claiming to represent the public, offer contradictory reactions to how they are being served (1993, p 106).

Agencies can accept and even embrace conflict. While few personnel who work with the Southwestern Oregon public are surprised by conflict, it is still difficult to positively incorporate it. Interaction with the Partnership sometimes reveals the old agency position on conflict: ignore, avoid, extinguish, or displace it. When faced with conflict, many agency personnel also fall back to a familiar posture of "dealing with an interest group" which conjures up a "fortress" perspective--closed down without open access. Though some agency people may see the Partnership as an "interest group," others see the group as a distinct set of individuals meriting continued relationship.

While there has been significant progress in local agencies, we still observe that representatives at the table are expected to absorb or smooth over issues. Representatives presumably are reluctant to take difficult issues back to higher levels of management where they can be acted upon. However, to do otherwise seems to deal only with specific problems or symptoms and not the overall causes; or worse, to have the conflict turn into crises, in which creative solutions are less readily available.

Since the expanded interpretation of FACA hit the Partnership, Su Rolle is only one consistent agency representative at the table. There is also considerable anger directed towards the agencies, as discussed earlier. Su has earned personal trust, respect and admiration from the group and people are reluctant to associate her with the agencies towards which they are venting their frustrations. Su can not absorb or extinguish the "agency bashing" and "acting out" which was so prevalent right after the FACA interpretation. During one such occurrence, a letter was sent, without Partnership Board approval or Su's knowledge, to agency heads and line officers accusing them of having deserted the Partnership. Although it elicited the desired response--significant agency attendance at a Board retreat--the basic ground rules of conduct had been breached and Su's position was compromised.

"Acting out" is a strategy of desperation for gaining agency attention. If a genuine response isn't forthcoming--and "acting out" seldom appears to deserve one--other solutions will be sought. If issues aren't dealt with at the local level the Partnership will take them elsewhere. Some Board members are
willing to employ their political and personal connections to regional—even national—centers of power. These "end runs" create problems not only for the local agencies, but some local members of the Partnership and community.

Our observations support Cortner and Shannon's suggestion that natural resources planning is an inherently political exercise: "there will always be unfulfilled expectations, multiple and conflicting goals, institutional constraints and limits to goal accomplishment" (1993, p. 14). Agency participation in partnerships can address these issues, but it must be broad and authentic involvement.

**Legal Obstacles**

Nothing appears to dissolve community support and trust more than having collaborative projects build up expectations and then hit legal obstacles which keep them from being implemented. This is a problem for the Watershed Council which solicited and developed restoration projects with neighborhoods and then had them turned down by the State. It is also a problem for the federal agency representatives who often are restricted by regulations which might stall or snuff out a proposed project. This was the case recently when the negotiated agreement between environmentalists and cattlemen couldn't be implemented in the near future on Carberry Creek. Baseline range analysis data are needed before reissuing the allotment and it is unlikely that staff can complete it in time for this, or perhaps even next, season. Both cattlemen eager to demonstrate their potential contribution to ecosystem health (e.g., grazing as a fire management tool) and public eager to monitor the results are intensely disappointed.

There is no easy solution to the difficulty of upholding regulations and standards while faced with the competing pressures from different publics. While some press for action and management experimentation, others sit back and wait for an opportunity to litigate. Some suggested collaborative efforts will fail to meet regulations; others may fail ecologically; others will be politically volatile. Agency directors and planners must work to provide clear institutional guidelines which clarify the responsibility and authority of local managers and specialists in order to support their successful and legal collaboration with the public.

**Power**

Land management institutions, in order to effectively involve the public in sustainable resource stewardship, must disperse some of their authority and power in order to encourage community members to invest in the process and take responsibility for the outcome. Agencies can support partnerships from below, but not mandate and control them from above.

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40This is not to say that litigation is always unwarranted.
Partnerships would benefit from agency support in the form of centrally located staff assistance for mailing minutes and agenda, copying reports, following through on requests for information, etc. Agencies could also help with funding and providing a place for meetings and storing archives. It is not clear, however, how much support is allowed, given FACA. Further, as the Applegate Partnership found, though more staff and financial support would help, the more that the Partnership can do on its own, the more it is empowered.

Sharing power is a difficult process, particularly given agency culture, regulations and political mandates. We recognize, also, that there are times and places where managers need to be swift and decisive. We hope, however, that others will join Su Rolle, interagency liaison to the Partnership, in striving to meet Jeff Sirmon's (1993) vision of leadership:

The federal resource manager is more than a convener of the community of interests. He or she must also be an effective intervenor and actively participate in dialogue and interchange with the communities. The effective federal leader will also be an educator, a provider of data, a developer of viable alternatives, an interpreter of law and regulation, and a representative of those not able to participate in dialogue and intercommunity transitions. As if this were not enough, the effective natural resource leader must also serve as protector of nonhuman interests and future interests, as well.

Incentives and Rewards

We would like to support current requests (made numerous places) that the culture of land management agencies provide incentives and rewards for flexibility, creativity and risk taking. We believe that structures should be developed that allow for more creative budgeting, sharing of decision making and forming relationships with new groups. We know agencies are hearing this mandate from many quarters and we see movement in this direction. Therefore we will simply provide a positive example of how we think the Partnership has helped agencies in this transformation.

A silviculturalist near retirement, was part of the team that designed Partnership One. When taking a visiting college class into the field to study the project, he told the students that he'd never look at a timber sale in the same way again. The following quote displays the value of encouraging and rewarding personnel to be exposed to such opportunities for change:

Here's Bill . . . [whose] silviculture prescriptions were based on the old paradigms. But, all of a sudden, he is being asked to be creative in ways he's never been creative in his whole career before, he's asked to be responsive to, to be really thinking about sustainability at a much different level and by really participating with the people, he's gotten much more excited about doing that.
he's a totally different man (Rolle, personal interview, 1995).

Partnerships are reflective; they require conscious social and ecological learning and experimentation that takes exorbitant amounts of time for what may appear to be limited output. They are messy and don't fit into the usual linear and rational models more common to federal land management agencies. Partnerships are a form of public involvement where people (both as agency and community members) "come to judgment" with "more thoughtfulness, more weighing of alternatives, more genuine engagement with the issues ... more emphasis on the normative, valuing, ethical side of questions than on the factual information side." (Yankelovich, 1991).

In order to encourage and reward participation in partnerships, agencies might usefully create new incentive structures that allow personnel to experiment, fail and take risks. They should also be encouraged to spend the necessary time to form successful working relationships with community members. While this may not appear cost-effective in the short run, we believe it is a wise investment as the decisions will be more sustainable--ecologically and socially--in the long run.

Turnover of Personnel

Again, we have heard this topic discussed in a number of forums, but feel it's worthy of note. Communities in general and partnerships in particular need continuity in agency personnel. It takes time to know a community and its relation to the land and it takes time to build trust in the community. When personnel leave, no matter how good the "institutional memory," knowledge and trust is lost.

Partnerships need continuity in agency representatives at meetings. Attendance is an important signal of commitment, it is also useful to have continuity through different stages of the process and projects. While it is useful to have visiting planners and scientists share work related to specific projects, ongoing personal relationships with the community representatives are key, and it is most worthwhile if these people have access to decision-making positions. As discussed earlier, it was a great loss to have relationships severed during the months when FACA created a divide between agency and other Partnership participants.

"Paradox of Scale"

We end this section with an affirmation of the idea that small scale institutions are required to successfully manage large-scale ecological processes, articulated as the "paradox of scale" by Lee and Stankey (1992). Often local community members bring to agencies highly personal concerns which have to do with conditions of specific places within the forest. "At stake are settings, sites and experiences that have special meaning to individuals, families and communities" (Kessler, n.d., p. 11).

These concerns require personal responses and site specific solutions that recognize the importance
of place. What matters to local people is a given landscape and how they participate in nature in their daily lives. While ecosystem management expands its scale from specific projects to larger landscapes, it also is concerned with human scale and attachments. While an extremely challenging issue, we are hopeful that partnerships can offer a successful model for achieving a more human scale and personal process. We also hope that partnerships (and their agency representatives) will continually remember to reach out into neighborhoods to meet people on an even more personal and non-threatening level.

Conclusions: Partnerships as a Response to Agency Critics

Partnerships and other community collaboration efforts address some of the major concerns raised by those analyzing the last decades' public forest management conflict. Writing in 1988, Wondolleck (1988a) forcefully argued that decision making and implementation processes adhered to an outmoded and inappropriate model. Since then, many others have repeated her concerns that these processes 1) have not been sufficiently informative or convincing, 2) have created divisiveness between publics and 3) were usually indecisive. This document attempts to demonstrate that the Applegate Partnership, by contrast, 1) has provided a forum in which agency personnel can be informative as they create projects which speak convincingly for themselves, 2) has employed principles of inclusiveness and conflict resolution, moving toward a common vision and unified set of goals and 3) has provided significant input and resolutely advocated for agency projects in the community.

Broadening the discussion to agencies' responsibilities to community development, Fortmann and Fairfax (1991) write:

Policy for the 1990's must involve plans for forest resources wherever and in whatever context they occur rather than for discrete national or industrial forests. The focus must be on rural regions and how forest resources contribute to regional economic and social wellbeing. This shift from a biological to a social planning context will accompany the shift from forest outputs to a focus on process. It is the formulation of a process which includes and responds to the full diversity of institutions and actors concerned with forest resources and which is crucial to the essential agenda of the next decade (p. 270-1).

The Partnership has indeed shifted to community outreach and social well-being as central.
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Francisco.


## APPENDIX
### ORIGINAL BOARD, OCTOBER, 1992

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<th>BOARD MEMBER</th>
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GLOSSARY

Adaptive Management Area (AMA): Landscape units designated by FEMAT for innovative, "localized, idiosyncratic approaches" to ecosystem management. They are to "rely on the experience and ingenuity of resource managers and communities rather than traditionally derived and tightly prescriptive approaches that are generally applied in management of forests," but still meet current standards and regulations (ROD, 1994). Adaptive Management--managing to learn while learning to manage--will be practiced in these areas.

AMA coordinator: Assigned to ten adaptive management areas to work with the relevant agencies and publics. In the Applegate, Su Rolle serves as the coordinator, although her official title is "Interagency Liaison" as her position was created before the AMAs.

Applegate Watershed Council: One of twelve watershed councils begun in Oregon under the administrative umbrella of SWMG (State Watershed Management Group) and directed by heads of several state agencies. Watershed Councils are supported by lottery monies to restore watershed ecosystems and educate residents about watershed health issues. Because the Applegate Partnership met many of the objectives and criteria of the Watershed Councils, it was designated the Council for the Applegate Valley by the county commissions during the spring of 1994. The Applegate Watershed Council has provided an opportunity for the Partnership to address forest health issues on private lands.

Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA): Created in 1972 to regulate the formation and operation of advisory committees to federal agencies. The act's goals are to limit the number of committees, to ensure they represent a balance of public views and to guarantee public access to the advisory process. While the spirit of the act is to ensure open collaborative processes for the public to access and participate in federal government decisions, recent strict interpretations of the act (brought on by the White House's concerns over a suit against the Clinton Forest Plan on grounds that it violated FACA, along with similar protests over the Health Plan) have restricted the ability of agency employees to engage in collaborative decision making with the Partnership. It has been interpreted that the Partnership can not "advise" the agencies directly, although a new layer of bureaucracy--the chartered Provincial Interagency Advisory Team--can approve Partnership recommendations.

Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team (FEMAT): An interagency, interdisciplinary team of scientists assembled after President Clinton's Forest Conference which produced a report, Forest Ecosystem Management: An Ecological, Economic, and Social Assessment, which developed and assessed ten options for managing forests in the owl region of the Pacific Northwest. The selected management alternative (Option 9) was implemented by a Record of Decision (ROD) in April, 1994.

Headwaters: The major environmental group in southwest Oregon. They define themselves as a non-profit educational group whose purpose is to "protect critical watersheds in southwest Oregon". Committed to alternative methods of logging, its primary goal is to reform public land management practices.

Interface: Also called the urban/wildland or urban/forest interface as this is the area between forests and cities where residential and forest activity collide. In these areas there is increased conflict between
residents living in a resource area and those making a living from them (e.g., dust from logging trucks and noise from helicopter logging); fire dangers and difficulties in fighting wildfires (or letting them burn naturally); and predator and wildlife concerns.

**Late Successional Reserves (LSR):** Forests designated by FEMAT to be in "mature and/or old-growth stages" (p. IX-18), and designated by the ROD as having "restricted management in order to protect and enhance conditions of late-successional and old-growth forest ecosystems, which serve as habitat for . . . species including the northern spotted owl" (p. A-4).

**Rogue Institute of Ecology and Economy (RIEE):** Fosters "community forestry" which sustains both the forest ecosystem and its local human community over the long term. Its many programs (e.g., certification, special forest products inventory, displaced-worker training) seek to unite workers and environmentalists in promoting sustainable forests, jobs and communities.

**Southern Oregon Timber Industries Association (SOTIA):** An advocacy organization representing timber dependent businesses in southwest Oregon. "Its objectives include: maintaining or increasing timber supply; ensuring a favorable operating climate for timber harvest and manufacturing with the public and government agencies; and promoting sound, scientifically-based forest practices and increased utilization of wood fiber" (Moffett, personal correspondence).